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I.    INTRODUCTION 
International law has evolved to the point that territorial 
entities, not generally considered states, can nonetheless trigger 
functional treatment as a state depending on their status. It is time to 
accept this practice as an emerging rule and not merely as case-by-case 
sui generis situations, so that we can build a legal regime to govern this 
practice and bring predictability to these entities. Many areas of the 
world operate as de facto states due to their status, yet for reasons of 
international law, such as the rule ex injuria jus non oritur, the 
international community cannot fully treat the territory as a state. 
However, this result can lead to an unjust outcome for the inhabitants 
of the territory because it may prevent the territory from participating 
in, and excuse the territory from complying with, important rules of 
international law. Aside from statehood, there is no other form of 
international legal personality that would permit a territorial entity to 
participate in international law in a satisfactory way. The territory must 
enjoy statehood under law, even if only on an ad hoc basis, in order to 
act within international law and engage in international relationships. 
Fortunately, international law is quite flexible and states can find a 
practical solution, which is to deny the territory full statehood, yet—
because of its status—treat the territory as if it were a state for the issue 
at hand. 
However, treating a territorial entity as if it were a state for 
some purposes means that the international community is now 
tolerating a relative statehood regime alongside the objective statehood 
regime currently in place. Many scholars have argued that it is illogical, 
insensible or unreasonable to view statehood as a relative 
phenomenon.1 Statehood must either be or not be. The problem is that 
relevant state practice shows a wide variety of situations where 
territorial entities in different statuses are treated as if they were states, 
but only for limited purposes. At some point, the sui generis description 
can no longer effectively describe widespread phenomena. This view 
                                               
 1 See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34, 
67, 78 (1947); JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 138 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); 
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20–2 (2d 
ed. 2007). 
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does find some support from other scholars, though only a minority 
at this point.2 Based on this sustained and extensive practice, we must 
bring quasi-states into the statehood regime and find a place for them 
in international law. This article will argue that we must accept that 
statehood can be applied relatively and that a functional analysis is the 
method for determining when an entity in a particular status will be 
treated as if it were a state. Currently, there is no clear rule to determine 
which status or issue results in treatment as if the entity were a state. 
This article will focus on the question of territorial status only, and will 
begin to build a more coherent and predictable test for whether an 
entity that is not a state will be treated as if it were a state. 
II. FUNCTIONAL STATEHOOD BASED ON STATUS 
A. Functional personality 
This article proposes that certain statuses of territorial entities 
can trigger a functional, case-by-case treatment of the territory as if it 
w a state. First, it will examine non-territorial entities in order to 
establish that relative personality is an acceptable and widespread 
practice in international law. Second, this article will examine state 
practice to determine that statehood, as a form of international 
personality, is also applied functionally in many cases. The status of a 
territorial entity, as a colony, trust territory, occupied area, international 
administration, transitional entities, secession movements and 
competing governments, is one such situation that can prompt the 
application of functional statehood. 
Before focusing on this specific practice of functional 
statehood, this article will look at comparable practices of functional 
personality for background. This practice has considerable pedigree in 
providing for relative and personality for various entities.3 
                                               
 2 See e.g. Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 
35 AM. J. INT’L L. 605, 609 (1941). 
 3 See William Thomas Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of Non-
State Actors, 42 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 207 (2017). 
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International organizations,4 self-determination “peoples”,5 National 
Liberation Movements (“NLMs”),6 indigenous peoples,7 belligerents,8 
                                               
 4 See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 30 (2d ed. 2007) (distinguishing between entities with objective legal personality, 
which exists “wherever the rights and obligations of an entity are conferred by 
general international law,” and those cases where an entity is created “by particular 
States for special purposes,” and only those states are bound); IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (6th ed., 2003); HENRY G. 
SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY 
WITHIN DIVERSITY §§44, 386–7 (4th ed. 2003); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND 
PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 49 (1994). 
 5 See E. Timor (Port. v. Aust’lia), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Reps. 90, 102 (June 
30); W. Sahara, Advisory Opinion 1975 I.C.J. Reps. 12, 32–3 (Oct. 16); Legal Conseq. 
for Sts. of the Cont. Presence of S-Afr. in Namib. (SW Afr.) notwithst. S. C. Res. 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Reps. 16, 31 (June 21); Reference re Secession 
of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, ¶ ¶ 119–23 (Sup. Ct., Can., 1998); Conference on 
Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Op. No. 2, 31 INT’L L. MATS. 1497 (1992). 
 6 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 et seq. (2005); M. N. 
Shaw, The International Status of National Liberation Movements, 5 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 19 
(1983); William Thomas Worster, The Exercise of Jurisdiction by the International Criminal 
Court over Palestine, 26 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 1153 (2011); Worster, Relative 
Personality of Non-State Actors, supra. 
 7 See W. Sahara, Adv. Op., 1975 I.C.J. Reps. 12, 75–84 (Oct. 16); Land & 
Marit. Boundary Betw. Cameroon & Nigeria (Cam. v. Nigeria; Eq. Guinea 
intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Reps. 303 ¶¶ 205–7 (Oct. 10); ANNA 
MEIJKNECHT, TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: THE POSITION OF 
MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 55 (2001); 
Tom Bennion, Treaty-Making in the Pacific in the Nineteenth Century and the Treaty of 
Waitangi, 35 VICT. UNIV. WELLINGTON L. REV. 165, 180 (2004); Antony Anghie, 
Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 
40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 18, n.106 (1999) (noting treaties between several European 
countries and African chiefs); Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern 
International Law, 7 ST. THOS. L. REV. 567, 569–71 & nn.12–13, 574, 583 (1995). 
 8 See Pros. v. Kony, et al., Case No.: ICC-02/04-01/05, Situation in Uganda, 
Dec. on the admiss. of the case under art. 19(1) of the Statute (Int’l Crim. Ct., Pre-
Tr. Ch. II, Mar. 10, 2009); Oriental Navigation Co. (US) v. Mex., IV UNRIAA 323, 
341, 346 (Oct. 3, 1928, Mex.-US Gen. Cl. Comm’n) (Nielsen, dissenting); MALCOLM 
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 219–20, 1040–41 (6th ed., 2008) (observing that the 
concepts of insurgency and belligerency are not easily distinguishable); ANTONIO 
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 124–7, 140–2 (2005); BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 4, at 62–3, 609; BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 1, at 133–5; 2 H 
LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (7TH ED., 1952); Steven 
Ratner, The Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1993); I.I. Lukashuk, 
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de facto entities,9 private entities,10 religious organizations,11 and even 
individuals12 have, from time-to-time, been treated as having 
international legal personality on a functional ad hoc basis rather than 
on an objective basis. For example, there have been cases of certain 
                                               
Parties to Treaties--The Right of Participation, 135 REC. DES COURS HAGUE ACAD. INT’L 
L. 231, 280–81 (1972–I). 
 9 See Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Pros. v Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, 
Judgment, ¶ 26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 20, 1995); O. 
CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (2010); MALCOLM SHAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1123 (6th ed, 2008). 
 10 For the Bank for International Settlements, see Reineccius, et al. v. Bank 
for Int’l Settlements, Partial Award on the Lawfulness of the Recall of the Privately 
Held Shares . . . , (Arb. Panel, Nov. 22, 2002) reprinted at INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
OF GENERAL JURISDICTION 375 (PCA 2002); BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, 
at 66–7. For the Global Alliance (“GAVI”), see Accord entre le Conseil fédéral suisse 
et GAVI Alliance (Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization) en vue de 
déterminer le statut juridique, June 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/i1/0.192.122.818.12.fr.pdf. For the IATA, see Jenni 
et al. v. Conseil d’État of the Canton of Geneva, ATF 104 Ia, p. 350; 1979 Ann. 
Suisse de droit int’l 151 (Fed. Trib. (Publ. L. Ch.), Switz., Oct. 4, 1978), translated at 
75 INT’L L. REPS. 99; Accord du 20 décembre 1976 entre le Conseil fédéral suisse et 
l’Association du Transport aérien international (“IATA”) pour régler le statut fiscal 
des services et du personnel de cette organisation en Suisse, Dec. 20, 1976, Switz.-
IATA, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/i1/0.192.122.748.fr.pdf. For the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, see Pros. v. Simić, et al. (“Bosanski 
Šamac”), Case No. IT-95, Ex parte Confidential Dec. on the Pros. Mtn under Rule 73 
for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 27, 1999). 
 11 See Treaty Between the Holy See and Italy (“Lateran Accords”), Feb. 11, 
1929, 130 Br. St. Papers Ser. 791. 
 12 See Treaty of Fontainebleau, Apr. 11, 1814 reprinted in 1(Bk. 9) ALPHONSE 
MARIE LOUIS DE LAMARTINE, THE HISTORY OF THE RESTORATION OF MONARCHY 
IN FRANCE 201-206 (Michael Rafter trans., 1854); U.S., et al., v. Goering, et al., 
Judgment (Int’l Mil. Trib. For the Trial of Germ. Major War Crimes., Sept. 30–Oct. 
1, 1946), reprinted at 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 
OCTOBER 1946 466 (1947); S.C. Res. 2178 ¶ 1 (Sept. 24, 2014) (“demands that all 
foreign terrorist fighters disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in the 
conflict”.) 
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organizations being considered international organizations for certain 
purposes and not for others.13 
Moving away from non-territorial entities to territorial entities 
and the application of functional statehood, certain issues often lead 
to an ad hoc application of this form of personality. Historically whether 
an entity qualified as a state for purposes of particular treaty regime 
often took a functional approach.14 In contemporary practice, some 
treaties may still create unique understandings of which actors are 
states for purposes of adherence.15 Similarly, functionalism can be 
                                               
 13 See Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional 
Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in 
International Law, 94 AM. J. Int’l L. 623, 625, 631–43, 655, 658 (2000); Int’l L. Assoc., 
Comm. on Accountability of Int’l Orgs., First report, at 5 (Feb. 1998) (treaty regimes 
are “incomplete international organizations”); William Thomas Worster, The Arms 
Trade Treaty Regime in International Institutional Law, 36 UNIV. PENN. J. INT’L L. 995 
(2015). 
 14 See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. Nov. 29 – Dec. 11, 1868 reprinted in D. 
SCHINDLER AND J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 102 (1988) (including 
as participants Austria-Hungary (Dec. 11, 1868), Baden (Jan. 11, 1869), Bavaria (Dec. 
11, 1868), Wurtemberg (Dec. 11, 1868) and the joint member of Prussia and the 
North German Confederation (Dec. 11, 1868)); Anne Peters, Treaty-Making Power, in 
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW paras. 61–2 
(Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2009). 
 15 See e.g. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (“CEDAW”), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (The Byelorussian 
SSR signed on July 17, 1980, ratified on Feb. 4, 1981, and withdrew its reservation 
on Apr. 19, 1989, and Ukrainian SSR signed on July 17, 1980, ratified on Mar. 12, 
1981, and withdrew its reservation on Apr. 20, 1989, when neither was considered a 
state under international law, but were permitted to do so under the terms of the 
CEDAW); Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 11, 
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, as adjusted and amended; MoP to the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer, 15th mtg., Dec. XV/3. Obligations of 
Parties to the Beijing Amendment under Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol with respect to 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (Nairobi, Kenya, Nov. 10–14, 2003), Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/9 (Nov. 11, 2003); Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities art. 44(1)-(2), Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. XXII, Mar. 29, 1972, 
961 U.N.T.S. 187; Pales. v Isr., Inter-st. comm. submit. By the St. of Pales. ag. Isr., 
UN Doc. CERD/C/100/5 (Comm. Elim. Racial Discrim., Dec. 12, 2019) 
(concluding that Palestine, despite a wide degree of non-recognition, can be treated 
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applied for membership in an international organization16 or 
recognition as a state separate from the question of membership in the 
organziation.17 In addition, quasi-state entities are sometimes protected 
under the law prohibiting aggression as stated in the UN Charter.18 
                                               
as a state party to the Racial Discrimination Convention for purposes of an inter-
state complaint against Israel). 
 16 See Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, Oct. 11, 1947, 
as amended; Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, 1964, as amended; Press 
Release, Int’l Crim. Police Org. (ICPO–INTERPOL), The State of Palestine and the 
Solomon Islands become INTERPOL member countries (Sept. 27, 2017) (available at 
https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2017/N2017-121). See generally 
Situ. in the St. of Palestine, No. ICC-01/18-11, Prosec. Req. purs. to art. 19(3) for a 
ruling on the Ct’s terr. juris. in Palest. (Int’l Crim. Ct, Pre-Tr. Ch., Dec. 20, 2019), 
withdrawn and refiled as Situ. in the St. of Palestine, No. ICC-01/18-12, Prosec. Req. 
purs. to art. 19(3) for a ruling on the Ct’s terr. juris. in Palest. (Int’l Crim. Ct, Pre-Tr. 
Ch., Jan. 22, 2019) (arguing that Palestine can be treated as a state party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court for purposes of the Court’s jurisdiction). 
 17 See UNSCOR 357th mtg. at 109 (Sept. 16, 1948); UNSCOR 184th mtg. at 
1984-5 (Aug. 14, 1947); UNSCOR 357th mtg. at 10–1 (Sept. 18, 1948); ROSALYN 
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE 
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 42–3 (1969). 
 18 See Appl. of the Conv. on the Prevention & Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia & Herz. v Serb & Monten.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 397 (June 
1); Armed Acts. on the Terr. of the Congo (DR Congo v Uganda), Judgement, 2005 
I.C.J. Reps. 168, ¶¶ 146–7 (Dec. 17); Mil. & Paramil. Acts. in & ag. Nicar. (Nicar. v 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 154–60 (June 27); S.C. Res. 262 (XXIII) ¶ 1 
(Dec. 31, 1968); UN Dept. Pol & Security Council Aff’rs, Repertoire of the Practice of the 
Security Council, Suppl. 1966-1968, UN Doc ST/PSCA/1/Add.5, 146, 163–64 (1971); 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970) (“Every State [ . . . ] has the duty to refrain from the 
threat or use of force to violate international lines of demarcation.”); CHRISTIAN J. 
TAMS & ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS, Contemporary Positivism and the Jus Ad Bellum, 
in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POSITIVISM IN A POST-MODERN WORLD 10 (Jean 
d’Aspremont & Jörg Kammerhofer, eds., 2013); O. CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST 
WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (2010); J. Frowein, De Facto Regime, paras. 4–5, in MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW paras. 61–2 (Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, ed., 2009); Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross Strait 
Relations between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 453, 469 (2000); N. N. Petro, The 
Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1524, 1526–28 
(2009); Stefan Talmon, The Constitutive Versus The Declaratory Theory of Recognition: 
Tertium Non Datur?, 75 BRIT. YB INT’L L. 101, 104 (2004); 1 Council of the Eur. 
Union, Indep. Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, The Report of the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (hereinafter 
“IIFFMCG Report”) 39–43 (Dec. 30, 2009) available at 
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Also, quasi-state territorial entities that may remain unrecognized due 
to ex injuria jus non oritur might nonetheless still have their public acts 
recognized under the “Namibia exception.”19 At a minimum, the 
inhabitants of a territorial entity should enjoy some kind of status akin 
to nationality, so as not to become stateless,20 although that nationality 
might be limited to certain purposes.21 Similarly, entities that do not 
qualify as states either due to lack of recognition or lack of jurisdiction, 
may still be held to human rights obligations and international 
                                               
http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html; Id. at 229–42; Nicholas Tsagourias, Non-state 
Actors in International Peace and Security: Non-state Actors and the Use of Force, in 
PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 
ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 326 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 
2011). 
 19 See Legal Conseq. for Sts. of the Cont. Presence of S-Afr. in Namib. (SW 
Afr.) notwithst. S.C. Res. 276 (1970), Adv. Op., 1971 I.C.J. Reps. 16, 55-6 (June 21); 
Cyprus v. Turk. Judgment (Merits), Vol. No. Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at (2001); 
Hopkins v. Mex., 4 U.N. REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 41 (1926); R. (on the application 
of Kibris Turk Hava Yollari) v Secretary of State for Transport, Case No: 
CO/3512/2007 [2009] EWHC 1918 (Admin); [2010] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 253 (QB, 
Engl., Admin. Ct., July 28, 2009); Emin v Yeldag [2002] 1 F.L.R. 956; B v B (Divorce: 
N. Cyprus) [2000] 2 F.L.R. 707 [2001] 3 F.C.R. 331; Somalia v Woodhouse Drake & 
Carey (Suisse) SA (The Mary) (QB, Engl., Commercial Ct., Mar. 13, 1992); Reel v 
Holder, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 30 June 1981 [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1226; [1981] 
3 All E.R. 321; (1981) 125 S.J. 585; (interpreting the meaning of “country” under 
International Amateur Athletic Federation rules as territory over which there is 
authority, not necessarily the same as the meaning of state or nation); Hesperides 
Hotels Limited v Aegean Turkish Holidays Limited [1978] 1 QB 205; In re Al-Fin 
Corporation’s Patent, [1970] Ch. 160, 177–81 (Apr. 2, 1969); Luigi Monta of Genoa 
v Cechofracht Co [1956] 2 QB 552; [1956] 3 WLR 480 (QB Div., June 14, 1956) 
(Sellers, J.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 205(3) (1987). 
 20 See 9 US DEP’T ST., FOR. AFF’RS MAN. 41.104, 41.113 (regarding 
passports from ROC Taiwan and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus); Caglar v 
Billingham (Insp. of Taxes) [1996] STC (SCD) 150, [1996] 1 LRC 526 (Spec. 
Comm’rs, Mar. 7, 1996); Hansard, Lords, col. WA205, HL162 (Jan. 15, 1998), 
Hansard, Commons, col. 277 (Jan. 15, 1998); CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, 
supra note 3, at 31 (regarding “A” Mandated Territories). 
 21 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., National Olympic committees: Palestine, available at 
http://www.olympic.org/palestine; UN Comp. Comm’n, Governing Council, 
S/AC.26/1992/10, art. 5.2 (June 26, 1992) (permitting claims by an appointed body 
or authority on behalf of individuals where the state of nationality will not or cannot 
claim); L.A. Taylor, The United Nations Compensation Commission, in REPARATIONS FOR 
VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 202 (C. 
Ferstman, M. Goetz, & A. Stephens eds., 2009). 
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humanitarian law so long as they exercise some form of effective 
control and/or engage in hostilities,22 most notably the Republic of 
China on Taiwan (“ROC”).23 Expanding on these obligations, while 
those officials from quasi-states might be able to generally claim 
immunities,24 certain officials of a quasi-state could be held responsible 
for international criminal law violations that take a flexible view on 
                                               
 22 For human rights, see Philip Alston, The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the 
International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE 
ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3-4 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); Colin Warbrick, States 
and Recognition in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 205, 213 (Malcolm Evans 
ed., 2003); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS 291-4 (2006); See generally Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 60 F. Supp. 
3d 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). For international humanitarian law, see Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1; 
Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment, ¶ 115–46 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 
COMMENTARY, I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (Jean 
S. Pictet gen. ed., 1952); Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and 
United Nations Military Operations, 1 YB INT’L HUMANIT. L. 3 (1998); LASSA 
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 203–4 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1955). 
 23 See ROC, OFF. PRES., President Ma Attends Press Conference Unveiling English 
Version of Taiwan’s First National Human Rights Report under the ICCPR and ICESCR 
(Dec. 18, 2012) available at 
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=28855&rmid=23
55; ROC, OFF. PRES., President Ma Holds Press Conference on the Release of Taiwan’s First 
Human Rights Report (Apr. 20, 2012) available at 
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&rmid=2355&itemid=270
92. 
 24 See Canadian State Immunity Act 1982, §14(1); State Immunity Act, 1978 
(U.K.); House of Commons (Canada), Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the 
Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Issue No. 60, at 24–30 (Feb. 4, 
1982) (“There could be situations in which, for policy reasons, the Secretary of State 
for External Affairs might wish to issue a certificate stating that country x, although 
not recognized, is a foreign state for the purposes of the act”); Inst. Int’l L., Resolution 
on Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government in 
International Law, art. 12 (2001) reprinted at 69 ANN. INST. DROIT INT’L 750 (2000-01); 
Limbin Hteik Tin Lat v. Burma, Shō 28 (yo) no. 9952, 5 Kakyū saibansho minji saiban 
reishū [Kaminshū] 836 (Japan) (Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Dist. Ct., Tokyo], June 9, 
1954) translated at 32 INT’L L. REPS. 124. 
2020 Territorial Status Triggering a Functional Approach to Statehood 8:1 
127 
statehood.25 Lastly, quasi-states can potentially contribute their practice 
to the formation of customary international law, when they are 
operating as a de facto state, even without international recognition.26 
Thus, while a given territory might be universally, or almost universally, 
considered not to be a state, the international community might 
overlook that formal legal conclusion and create an exception in these 
situations where the formal approach would harm individuals or 
permit quasi-state actors to evade international responsibility. 
                                               
 25 See Int’l Crim. Ct., Assembly of Sts. Parties, Review Conference, Res. 6: 
The Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc. RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010); G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) 
(Dec. 14, 1974); Worster, Exercise of Jurisdiction, supra note 50; ICC, Assembly of States 
Parties, States Parties, Asian States, Cook Islands, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/Asian+States/Cook+Islands.htm; UN FACT 
FINDING MISSION ON THE GAZA CONFLICT, Report (“Goldstone Report”), U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/12/48, 509, ¶ 1633 (Sept. 15, 2009) (any entity in the Gaza Strip that 
functions as a government is responsible for enforcing international humanitarian 
law and human rights law on armed groups in Gaza). 
 26 See Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction Between Customary International Law and 
Treaties, 322 REC. DES COURS HAGUE ACAD. INT’L L. 243, 267 (2006); Michael 
Reisman, The Democratization of Contemporary International Law-Making Processes and the 
Differentiation of Their Application, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
TREATY MAKING 28–9 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2005); Anthea 
Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups 
in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 117–18 (2012); 
Alain Pellet, Spec. Rapp., Int’l L. Comm’n, Third Report on Reservations to Treaties, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/491, ¶ 6 (Apr. 30, 1998). For citations to the practice of the Saar as if 
it were a state, see Int’l L. Comm’n, Roberto Cordova, Spec.Rapp., Report on the 
elimination or reduction of statelessness, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/64, II, YB INT’L L. COMM’N 
170 (1953), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/8ER.A/1953/Add.1; Int’l L. Comm’n, Roberto 
Ago, Spec.Rapp., Fourth report on State responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264 & ADD.l, 
II YB INT’L L. COMM’N 111 (1972), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1972/Add.1; Int’l 
L. Comm’n, Ivan S. Kerno (Expert), Nationality, including Statelessness – Analysis of 
Changes in Nationality Legislation of States since 1930, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/67, 2, 4, 5 
(Apr. 6, 1953). For citations to the practice of the Free City of Danzig as if it were a 
state, see U.N. Secretariat, Digest of Decisions of National Courts Relating to Succession of 
States and Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/157, II YB INT’L L. COMM’N 97 (1963), 
U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963/ADD.1; Int’l L. Comm’n, Ivan S. Kerno (Expert), 
Nationality, including Statelessness – Analysis of Changes in Nationality Legislation of States 
since 1930, U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/67, 2 (Apr. 6, 1953); Int’l L. Comm’n, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-fifth session, 7 May -13 July 1973, 
UNGAOR 28th sess., Suppl. No. 10, U. N. Doc. A/9010/Rev.1, II YB INT’L L. 
COMM’N (1973). 
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B. Functional statehood based on status 
However, it is not only those situations mentioned above that 
can lead to functional treatment of an entity as if it were a state; it is 
also the particular status of the territory that can trigger the functional 
application of statehood. This article will examine various types of 
status, and identify the functional analysis being applied. 
1. Colonial Empires/Mandates/Protected States 
Colonial empires, mandates and protected states present a 
challenge from statehood theory. Were these entities simply part of the 
state that administered the territory or were they separate persons? The 
approach has been functional for imperial territories such as the British 
Raj and Kenya,27 but less clear for protectorates and protected states 
                                               
 27 See British Settlements Act 1887 (esp. art. 12, reserving the right to 
legislate for the colony); Order in Council, June 11, 1920 [Kenya (Annexation) Order] 
(Creating the colony of Kenya); Letters Patent of 11 September 1920 (establishing a 
government by act of British law); Kenya Independence Act 1963 (granting Kenya 
independence by act of British law); Kenya Independence Order in Council 1963 
(providing for a constitution for Kenya); Gov’t India, For. Dep’t, Proceedings, 
Judicial, IOR P/752, No. 9, p. 14. (Sep. 1873) (advising against more precise 
definition of sovereign relationships because “To do so would, in our opinion, 
reduce the right which we claim to exercise as the Paramount Power in India to a 
matter of negotiation between us and those over whom we assert the right.”); Mutua 
et al, v. For. & Commonwealth Ofc., Case No: HQ09X02666, [2011] EWHC 1913 
(High Ct., QB, UK, July 21, 2011) (McCombe, J); CRAWFORD, CREATION OF 
STATES, supra note 3, at 320–23 (describing Great Britain’s relationship with the 
Indian Native States prior to 1947 and explaining that, while Britain considered those 
areas “as extraterritorial . . . [and afforded them] the general right to internal self-
government,” it also claimed the rights to “conduct international relations, exercise 
. . . jurisdiction over Europeans and Americans, . . . and [regulate their militaries].”); 
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (2004); NASSER HUSSAIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
EMERGENCY: COLONIALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003); IAN COPLAND, THE 
PRINCES OF INDIA IN THE ENDGAME OF EMPIRE, 1917-1947 (2002); MICHAEL 
FISHER, INDIRECT RULE IN INDIA: RESIDENTS AND THE RESIDENCY SYSTEM, 1764-
1858 (1993); KENNETH ROBERTS-WRAY, COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL LAW 
339 (1966); K. M. PANIKKAR, THE INDIAN PRINCES IN COUNCIL: A RECORD OF THE 
CHANCELLORSHIP OF HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA OF PATIALA, 1926-1931 AND 
1933-36 (1936); JOHN WESTLAKE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE 
88–9, 182, 198, 220–3 (L. Oppenheim ed., 1914); WILLIAM LEE-WARNER, THE 
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such as Bhutan and San Marino,28 as well as associated states like 
Puerto Rico.29 The international legal system often has had to 
determine whether these entities were simply part of the state that 
administered the territory or were separate persons, and the approach 
taken was functional, inquiring whether the entity was acting as a state 
for purposes of the question asked.30 
This section will now consider the situation where the a 
territory was considered to have some form of separate international 
personality from the personality of its colonial state. This analysis is 
distinct from the functional treatment of indigenous peoples as having 
a degree of international personality, as already mentioned above in the 
brief overview of other forms of functional personality. In the 
discussion here, it is not critical that the people are indigenous, in the 
special meaning of that term, but rather that they are simply the 
permanent residents of a colonized territory. In many cases a 
metropolitan state and its local colonial government acted on behalf of 
a colonial territory as if it did not have any distinct personality, such as 
                                               
PROTECTED PRINCES OF INDIA 376–82 (1894); Lauren Benton, From International 
Law to Imperial Constitutions: The Problem of QuasiSovereignty, 1870-1900, 26 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 595 (Fall 2008) (citing H. S. Maine, Minutes, Kattywar States; Sovereignty, IOR 
V/27/100/3, 35–8 (Mar. 22, 1864)); Lauren Benton, Constitutions and Empires, 31 L. 
& SOC. INQ. 177 (2006). 
 28 See Nat’lty Decrees Issued in Tunis & Mor., Advisory Opinion, 1923 
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 27 (Feb. 7); CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 
3, at 288–9. 
 29 See generally CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 3, at 20; Lani 
E. Medina, An Unsatisfactory Case of Self-Determination: Resolving Puerto Rico’s Political 
Status, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1048 (2010) (examining the meaning of “self-
determination” in international law, and arguing that “the people of Puerto Rico have 
yet to fully exercise their right to self-determination”). 
 30 See Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Gr. v. UK), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 5, at 50 (Mar. 26) (determining that the “state” at issue was “Palestine”, a 
separate legal person from the mandatory power); CRAWFORD, CREATION OF 
STATES, supra note 3, at 320. 
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Australia,31 Belgium,32 France,33 Italy,34 Japan,35 Netherlands,36 
Portugal,37 Russia,38 Spain,39 and the UK.40 The preceding colonial 
                                               
 31 See e.g. Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of 
Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 (“[i]ncluding the territories of 
Papua and Norfolk Island”); Special Protocol concerning Statelessness, Apr. 12, 
1930, 2252 L.N.T.S. 435 (“[i]Including the territories of Papua and Norfolk Island 
and the mandated territories of New Guinea and Nauru.”). 
 32 See e.g. International Radiotelegraph Convention, July 5, 1912, 216 C.T.S. 
244 (Belgium on behalf of the Belgian Congo); Convention on Certain Questions 
relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 (“Subject 
to accession later for the Colony of the Congo and the Mandated Territories.”); 
Special Protocol concerning Statelessness, Apr. 12, 1930, 2252 L.N.T.S. 435 (“With 
the reservation that the application of this Protocol will not be extended to the 
Colony of the Belgian Congo or to the Territories under mandate.”). 
 33 For France acting on behalf of Algeria, French West Africa, French 
Equatorial Africa, French Indo-China, French Madagascar, and Tunis, see 
International Radiotelegraph Convention, July 5, 1912, 216 C.T.S. 244; Regulations 
annexed to the Revised International Telegraph Convention, July 10, 1903, 193 
C.T.S. 327; Revision of the International Service Regulations annexed to the 
International Telegraph Convention of St. Petersburg of 22 July 1875, July 22, 1875, 
183 C.T.S. 159; Service Règlement annexed to the International Telegraph 
Convention, June 11, 1908, 207 C.T.S. 89. 
 34 For Italy acting on behalf of Eritrea and Italian Colonies, see Int’l 
Telegraph Convention Service Règlement, supra note 33; International 
Radiotelegraph Convention, supra note 33. 
 35 For Japan acting on behalf of Korea, Formosa (Taiwan), Sakhalin, and 
Kwantung Leased Territory see International Radiotelegraph Convention, supra note 
33. 
 36 For Netherlands acting on behalf of the Dutch East Indies, Netherlands 
New Guinea, Suriname, Curacao and Netherlands Antilles see Int’l Telegraph 
Convention Service Règlement, supra note 33; Basic Agreement concerning 
assistance from the World Food Programme, Aug. 13, 1971, UN/Food & Agri. Org 
(World Food Prog.) – Neths. (Neths. Antilles) No. 11684; International 
Radiotelegraph Convention, supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph Convention Regulations, 
supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph Convention Revised Regulations, supra note 33; 
Protocol on Road signs and signals, Sept. 19, 1949, 182 U.N.T.S. 229; 514 U.N.T.S. 
254 (amendment); Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of 
Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 (Apr. 2, 1937) (“[i]ncluding the 
Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curaçao.”). 
 37 See Portugal acting on behalf of Portuguese Colonies, Macau, Portuguese 
India, and Portuguese Overseas Provinces of Angola and Mozambique, see Int’l 
Telegraph Convention Regulations, supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph Convention 
Revised Regulations, supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph Convention Service Règlement, 
supra note 33; International Radiotelegraph Convention, supra note 33; Int’l 
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Telegraph Convention Service Règlement, supra note 33; Constitution of the Asia – 
Pacific Telecommunity, Mar. 27, 1976, 1129 U.N.T.S. 3 (Macau as associate 
member); Agreement for the Exchange of Value payable Articles between the Post 
Offices of British (Great Britain) and Portuguese India (Portugal), Jan. 28, Feb. 11, 
1907, 203 C.T.S. 312; Protocol on Road signs and signals, Sept. 19, 1949, 182 
U.N.T.S. 229; 514 U.N.T.S. 254 (amendment). 
 38 For Russia acting on behalf of Russian Possessions or Protectorates, see 
International Radiotelegraph Convention, supra note 33. 
 39 For Spain acting on behalf of Spanish Colonies, and “African localities 
and provinces”, see Int’l Telegraph Convention Revised Regulations, supra note 33; 
Protocol on Road Signs and Signals, Sept. 19, 1949, 182 U.N.T.S. 229; 514 U.N.T.S. 
254 (amendment). 
 40 For the UK acting on behalf of Australia, Bermuda, Burma, Canada, Cape 
Colony, Cayman Islands, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Crete, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), 
Gibraltar, Guernsey, Hong Kong, India, Isle of Man, Jersey, Natal, New Zealand and 
South Africa, see Arrangement for the Exchange of Money Orders, Germ.-India (by 
Gr. Brit.), Jan. 18, 22 1875, 148 C.T.S. 323; Convention Regarding the Conversion 
into an Annual Payment of the Rights in connection with the Opium Trade reserved 
by the Convention of 7 March 1815, Fr.-India (by Gr. Brit.), July 16, 1884, 164 C.T.S. 
217; Money Order Agreement, India (by Gr. Brit.)-Norw., May 24, August 8, 1910, 
211 C.T.S. 159; Money Order Arrangement, Den.- India (by Gr. Brit.), June 21, July 
19, 1880, 156 C.T.S. 94; Money Order Arrangement, Den.- India (by Gr. Brit.), Nov. 
29, 1875, Jan. 4, 1876, 150 C.T.S. 101; Money Order Arrangement, Germ.- India (by 
Gr. Brit.), May 20, June 22, 1880, 156 C.T.S. 72; Money Order Arrangement, India 
(by Gr. Brit.)-Ital., June 18, July 13, 1880, 156 C.T.S. 90; Money Order Arrangement, 
India (by Gr. Brit.)-Switz., Sept. 13, Oct. 9, 1880, 156 C.T.S. 118; Money Order 
Arrangement, India (by Gr. Brit.)-Switz., June 1, 17, 1875, 148 C.T.S. 374; Money 
Order Agreement between Cape Colony (Great Britain) and Norway, Nov. 16, Dec. 
20, 1904, 197 C.T.S. 182; Agreement for the Exchange of Value payable Articles 
between the Post Offices of British (Great Britain) and Portuguese India (Portugal), 
Jan. 28, Feb. 11, 1907, 203 C.T.S. 31; International Radiotelegraph Convention, supra 
note 33; Int’l Telegraph Convention Regulations, supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph 
Convention Revised Regulations, supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph Convention Service 
Règlement, supra note 33; Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict 
of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 (“[including] all parts of the 
British Empire which are not separate members of the League of Nations.”) 
(regarding Burma, “His Majesty the King does not assume any obligation in respect 
of the Karenni States, which are under His Majesty’s suzerainty, or the population of 
the said States”), (“In accordance with the provisions of Article 29, His Britannic 
Majesty does not assume any obligation in respect of the territories in India of any 
Prince or Chief under his suzerainty or the population of the said territories.”); 
Special Protocol concerning Statelessness, Apr. 12, 1930, 2252 L.N.T.S. 435 
(“[including] all parts of the British Empire which are not separate Members of the 
League of Nations”), (“His Majesty the King does not assume any obligation in 
respect of the Karenni States, which are under His Majesty’s suzerainty, or the 
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practice, however, overlapped with other colonies that were able to 
sometimes act independently, even while remaining within their 
relevant empire, as if they did have distinct international personality. 
Entities falling in this category include Australia,41 Canada,42 New 
South Wales,43 New Zealand,44 Queensland,45 South Australia,46 
Victoria,47 and West Australia,48 while still within the British Empire. 
It is tempting to dismiss these aberrations because the treaties were on 
“technical” topics (e.g. international telecommunications) but the 
subject matter of the treaties does not diminish the legal authority 
necessary to undertake them. What is even stranger is that in some 
cases, these colonial entities entered into treaties with other colonial 
entities within the same empire.49 This functionally independent 
personality could even be recognized in the relations between the 
colony and the metropolitan state itself. For example, in South Africa, 
the UK treated the Boer settlers as having their own international legal 
                                               
population of the said States”), (“In accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of 
this Protocol, His Britannic Majesty does not assume any obligation in respect of the 
territories in India of any Prince or Chief under His suzerainty or the population of 
the said territories”); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (Kyoto Protocol); Exchange 
of notes Constituting an Agreement on the Reciprocal Recognition of Driving 
Licenses, Dec. 11, 1986, Belg.-UK (Channel Isls.), 673 U.N.T.S. 55. 
 41 See Int’l Telegraph Convention Service Règlement, supra note 33. 
 42 See Additional Act to the Universal Postal Convention of 1 June 1878, 
with Final Protocol and modification of Regulations, Mar. 21, 1885, 165 C.T.S. 110. 
 43 See Int’l Telegraph Convention Revised Regulations, supra note 33. 
 44 See Int’l Telegraph Convention Regulations, supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph 
Convention Revised Regulations, supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph Convention Service 
Règlement, supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph Convention Regulations, supra note 33. 
 45 See Int’l Telegraph Convention Revised Regulations, supra note 33. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See e.g. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, June 5, 1946, 27 
U.N.T.S. 207 Can.-UK; Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Extending 
the Above-Mentioned Agreement to Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar, Aug. 
2, 1956, Can.-UK, U.N.T.S. 336. 
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personality during the time when they were attempting to break away 
from the British Empire.50 
It is tempting to consider this practice as only historically 
relevant, but this is not just historical practice and continues to the 
present day. Some states continue to view territories for which they are 
internationally responsible as having a form of distinct personality that 
must be exercised as such, separately and distinctly from the 
personality of the metropolitan state, even though the (colonial) 
territory is not a state. These situations would include, inter alia, the 
People’s Republic of China (“PR China”) when acting for Hong 
                                               
 50 See Int’l Telegraph Convention Service Règlement, supra note 33; 
Agreement as to Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces in the Field, May 31, 1902, 
Gr. Brit.-Orange Free St.-S. Afr. Rep. [Transvaal], 191 C.T.S. 232; Additional 
Protocol to the Extradition Convention of 1/7 September 1887, Aug. 2, 6, 1895, Gr. 
Brit.- Orange Free St., 182 C.T.S. 27; Extradition Convention, Gr. Brit.-Orange Free 
St., June 20, 25, 1890, 173 C.T.S. 255; Railway Convention, 1890, Gr. Brit.-Orange 
Free St., 173 C.T.S. 57; Convention, Aug. 3, 1881, Gr. Brit.-Transvaal Burghers, 159 
C.T.S. 57; Frontier Agreement, July 13, 1876, Gr. Brit.-Orange Free St., 150 C.T.S. 
483-1; Railway Agreement, July 13, 1876, Gr. Brit.-Orange Free St., 150 C.T.S. 483-
2; Convention Respecting Basutoland, Feb. 12, 1869, Gr. Brit.-Orange Free St., 139 
C.T.S. 79; Convention, Feb. 23, 1854, Gr. Brit.-Orange River Terr., 111 C.T.S. 313; 
Convention of Peace, Commerce, Slave Trade etc., Jan. 17, 1852, Gr. Brit.-Transvaal 
Boers, 107 C.T.S. 299. Also see Extradition Convention, Nov. 27, 1894, Belg.-Orange 
Free St., 180 C.T.S. 417; Convention for the Extradition of Criminals, Apr. 24, 1893, 
Neths.-Orange Free St., 178 C.T.S. 383; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Establishment, Feb. 3, 1876, Belg..-Transvaal Rep., 150 C.T.S. 233; Treaty of 
Friendship and Commerce, Dec. 11, 1875, Port.-Transvaal Rep., 150 C.T.S. 43; 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Boundaries, July 29, 1869, Port.-Transvaal 
Rep., 139 C.T.S. 415; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field [Geneva Convention], Aug. 22, 1864 (entry into 
force June 22, 1865, no longer in force) reprinted in D. SCHINDLER AND J. TOMAN, 
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 280–1 (1988) (including as participants the 
Orange Free State (Sept. 28, 1897)) 
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Kong51 or Macau;52 Denmark when acting for the Faroe Islands;53 and 
the UK54 when acting for its various overseas territories and 
dependencies.55 If these territories held no international personality, 
                                               
 51 See Kyoto Protocol. 
 52 See id.; Gov’t UK, Letter of notification to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations of treaties applicable to Hong Kong after 1 July 1997 (June 20, 1997) 
reprinted at 26 INT’L L. MATS. 1675; Gov’t PR China, Letter of notification to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations of treaties applicable to Hong Kong after 1 
July 1997, id. 
 53 See Agreement concerning mutual fishery relations, May 1, 1992, Est.-
Gov’t Den. & Nat’l Exec. (Landsstyre) Faroe Isls., 1774 UNTS ___, U.N. Reg. No. 
30891. 
 54 Cf. Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of 
Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 ([including] all parts of the British 
Empire which are not separate members of the League of Nations”); Special Protocol 
Concerning Statelessness, Apr. 12, 1930, 2252 L.N.T.S. 435 (“[including] all parts of 
the British Empire which are not separate Members of the League of Nations”) with Convention 
on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 
179 L.N.T.S. 89 (“His Majesty the King does not assume any obligation in respect 
of the Karenni States, which are under His Majesty’s suzerainty, or the population of 
the said States.” “In accordance with the provisions of Article 29, His Britannic 
Majesty does not assume any obligation in respect of the territories in India of any 
Prince or Chief under his suzerainty or the population of the said territories.”); 
Special Protocol concerning Statelessness, Apr. 12, 1930, 2252 L.N.T.S. 435 (“His 
Majesty the King does not assume any obligation in respect of the Karenni States, 
which are under His Majesty’s suzerainty, or the population of the said States.” “In 
accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of this Protocol, His Britannic Majesty 
does not assume any obligation in respect of the territories in India of any Prince or 
Chief under His suzerainty or the population of the said territories.”). 
 55 For Anguilla, see Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 
1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211; Agreement establishing the Caribbean Development Bank 
(“CDB Agreement”), Oct. 18, 1969, 712 U.N.T.S. 217; 1021 U.N.T.S. 417 
(amendment); 1401 U.N.T.S. 265 (amendment). For Bermuda, see Kyoto Protocol, 
supra note 199; Mine Ban Convention, supra note 45. For the British Antarctic 
Territory, see Mine Ban Convention, supra. For the British Indian Ocean Territory, see 
id. For the British Virgin Islands, see id.; CDB Agreement, supra. For the Cayman 
Islands, see Kyoto Protocol, supra; Mine Ban Convention, supra; CDB Agreement, 
supra. For the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, see Kyoto Protocol, supra; Mine Ban 
Convention, supra. For Guernsey, see Mine Ban Convention, supra; Kyoto Protocol, 
supra. For Gibraltar, see Exchange of Notes constituting an agreement concerning 
Gibraltar, in connection with the signature and subsequent ratification of the Treaty 
relating to the accession of Spain to the European Communities, June 13, 1985, Sp.-
UK, 1422 U.N.T.S. ___ U.N. Reg. No. 24018; Kyoto Protocol, supra. For Hong 
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then there would be no need to invoke a distinct personality when 
acting on their behalf. Instead, the metropolitan state would simply 
enter into the treaty and observe that its terms only applied to a portion 
of its territory that lies overseas. And yet, in all of these cases, the 
metropolitan state acts as if the colonial territory has a distinct 
personality that the metropolitan state is charged with administering. 
Paradoxically, some of these same states with responsibility for 
overseas territories then take a contrary approach. They may make 
specific efforts to exclude those overseas territories when they adhere 
to certain other treaties, as if the overseas territories did not have a 
personality distinct from the metropolitan state.56 Apparently, there is 
a risk that by adhering to the treaty, the metropolitan state would 
necessarily include the colonial territory. This practice thus reveals a 
kind of schizophrenia. If these territories had a distinct personality, 
then the colonial government would need to exercise that power, and 
we would not assume that the territory was included when the 
metropolitan state acted. But then, metropolitan states must be 
assuming their colonies would be included, or else they would not act 
to exclude them. To some degree, this question could be answered by 
                                               
Kong, see Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Concerning the Status and 
Privileges and Immunities of the Office and Staff of the Commission of the 
European Communities in Hong Kong, Oct. 9, 25, 1993, Hong Kong (“under and 
entrustment of authority from the UK Government”)-EU, 1765 U.N.T.S., U.N. Reg. 
No. 30691. For Jersey, see Mine Ban Convention, supra; Exchange of Notes 
Constituting an Agreement Concerning the Avoidance of Double Taxation on 
Income Derived from Sea and Air Transport, Nov. 5, 1963, UK (in respect of Jersey) 
– Fr., 539 U.N.T.S. 278. For the Isle of Man, see Mine Ban Convention, supra; Kyoto 
Protocol, supra. For Montserrat, see Mine Ban Convention, supra; CDB Agreement, 
supra. For the Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, see Mine Ban 
Convention, supra. For St. Helena and Dependencies, see id. For South Georgia and 
the South Sandwich Islands, see id. For the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and 
Dhekelia, see Mine Ban Convention, supra note 45. For Turks and Caicos Islands, see 
id., CDB Agreement, supra. 
 56 See id.; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 199; Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Pyschotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, ECOSOC Doc. 
E/CONF.82/15, Corr.1 & Corr.2, __ U.N.T.S. __, U.N. Reg. No. 27627 (Illicit Drug 
Traffic Convention); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S.13; Constitution of the Asia – Pacific 
Telecommunity, Mar. 27, 1976, 1129 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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consulting each state’s unique constitutional arrangements, though 
international law does not usually regard constitutional law as having 
any role in international law. Even if we did adopt this approach, we 
would still find a degree of incoherence.57 
When empires were converted to mandates, the approach to 
personality was once again functional, recognizing that the personality 
of the local territory existed, but was suspended.58 Today several non-
self-governing territories are treated as if they were states by permitting 
them to enter into treaties, join international organizations and 
conduct foreign relations on functional matters.59 New Caledonia, as 
an example, is sometimes described as a sui generis entity with unclear 
international legal personality pending its independence referendum.60 
However, the claim of this entity in particular may be better classified 
as a restored sovereignty.61 The Human Rights Committee held that 
                                               
 57 See e.g. the practice of the UK in the British Imperial system regarding 
certain entities of equivalent constitutional status, supra. 
 58 See CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 3, at 31; Alexandros 
Yannis, The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and Its Implications in 
International Politics, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1037 (2002). 
 59 See Agreement establishing the Caribbean Development Bank, Oct. 18, 
1969, 712 U.N.T.S. 217, 1021 U.N.T.S. 437 (amendment), 1401 U.N.T.S. 265 
(amendment) (membership including Anguilla (as of May 4, 1982), British Virgin 
Islands (Jan. 30, 1970), Cayman Islands (Jan. 27, 1970), Montserrat (Jan. 28, 1970) 
and the Turks and Caicos Islands (Jan. 5, 1970)); McGonnell v UK, Appl. No. 
28488/95, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. (2000); CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 
3, at 739–40 (including Palestine on the list of “Territorial Entities Proximate to 
State”); US DEP’T OF ST., OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, A Guide to the United States’ History 
of Recognition, Diplomatic,, and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: Cayman Islands 
available at http://history.state.gov/countries/cayman-islands, (“Although the 
United Kingdom is responsible for the Cayman Islands’ defense and external affairs, 
important bilateral issues are often resolved by negotiations between the Cayman 
Government and foreign governments, including the United States.”). 
 60 Accord sur la Nouvelle-Caédonie [Agreement on New Caledonia] 
[“Noumea Accord”], May 5, 1998, J.O. Rep. Fr. No. 121, p. 8039 (May 27, 1998); 
Constitution Act of New Caledonia, Loi No. 98–610 (July 20, 1998); Loi organique 
No. 99–209 (Mar. 19, 1999); Dec. No. 99–410 DC, J.O. Rep. Fr., p.4234 (Const. Ct., 
Fr., Mar. 15, 1999). 
 61 See Int’l Telegraph Convention Regulations, supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph 
Convention Revised Regulations, supra note 33; Int’l Telegraph Convention Service 
Règlement, supra note 33; Treaty for the Cession of their Domains, Jan. 1, 1844, Fr.-
Kings & Chiefs of New Caledonia, 96 C.T.S. 7. 
2020 Territorial Status Triggering a Functional Approach to Statehood 8:1 
137 
the measures to distinguish a qualifying electorate for the New 
Caledonian referenda was not ethnic discrimination,62 implying that 
qualification based on residency status was a valid means for 
establishing the people for purposes of self-determination. In the 
meantime, New Caledonia operates a “shared sovereignty” system,63 
blurring its personality with that of France, and with a functional 
approach to its international relations.64 
But New Caledonia’s shared sovereignty system is not 
completely unique. The Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau are 
considered territories of New Zealand, and their people are all New 
Zealand nationals, although these distinct territories are increasingly 
exercising their own international capacity. For example, while it was 
initially considered that they did not have independent treaty making 
powers, that view has evolved, so that the three territories have now 
entered into treaties,65 including treaties of serious international gravity, 
                                               
 62 See Gillot et al. v Fr., Comm. No. 932/2000, Views of the Hum. Rts. 
Comm., U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/75/D/932/2000 (Hum. Rts. Comm., July 21, 
2002) (finding that the differentiations between residents of New Caledonia for 
purposes of forming a qualifying electorate pursuant to the Noumea Accord 
referenda was not discrimination based on ethnicity or national extraction). 
 63 See NEW CALEDONIA, NOUVELLE-CALEDONIE: RAPPORT ANNUEL 2012, 
INST. D’EMISSION D’OUTRE-MER (2013) available at 
http://www.la-nouvelle-
caledonie.com/app/download/5793071486/IEOM+RAPPORT+ANNUEL+201
3+NOUVELLE-CALEDONIE.pdf; Government of France, Front de Libération 
Nationale Kanak et Socialiste and the Rassemblement Pour la Calédonie dans la 
République (“RPCR”) (unofficial English trans. available at 7(1) AUSTR’LIA INDIG. L. 
REP. 17 (2002)); Constitution [Fr.], Title XIII, arts. 76-77, as amended July 6, 1998). 
 64 See e.g. joining Pacific Islands Forum in 1999. 
 65 See UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 
2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (adopted by G.A. Res. 
A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) (Cook Islands adhered on Mar. 4, 2004); Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (Cook 
Islands adhered on July 18, 2008); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (Cook Islands 
signed on Sept. 16, 1998 and adhered on Aug. 27, 2001); Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 (Cook Islands 
signed on Dec. 3, 1997 and adhered on Mar. 15, 2006); Basic Agreement for the 
Establishment of Technical Advisory Cooperation Relations, Sept. 21, 1994, WHO-
Niue, 1884 U.N.T.S. 440; Agreement Concerning Air Services, July 12, 1990, N. 
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even though their status is still subject to disagreement depending on 
the issue at hand.66 In fact, Niue has even entered into a treaty with 
New Zealand.67 
In addition to questioning treaty practice, we might also 
consider whether colonial or trust entities contribute to customary 
international law. The ICJ has relied on the practice of colonial powers 
over their territories overseas as evidence of customary international 
law,68 presumably considering such actions to qualify as state practice. 
The International Law Commission has also relied on colonial practice 
as contributing to customary international law.69 This view has been 
                                               
Zealand-Niue, 1865 U.N.T.S. 333; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Constitution of 
the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, Mar. 27, 1976, 1129 U.N.T.S. 3 (including 
participation of the Cook Islands (July 21, 1987), New Zealand (with a declaration 
of nonapplication to Niue and Tokelau) (Jan. 13, 1983), Niue (Nov. 14, 1994)); 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the U.N., Feb. 13, 1946, 1 UNTS 
15; 90 U.N.T.S. 327 (corr.). 
 66 Cf. Brannigan v. Davison (“Winebox Case”) [1996] 3 WLR 859, 863; 108 
ILR 622 (PC, NZ, Oct. 14, 1996) (as per Nicholls of Birkenhead, L.) (arguing that 
“The Cook Islands is a fully sovereign independent state.”); with UN Secretariat, 
Office L. Aff’rs, Memorandum addressed to the Chief of Division One, Regional 
Bureau for Asia and the Pacific of the United Nations Development Programme, 
Question whether the Cook Islands are eligible to receive a United Nations development programme 
indicative planning figure (“IPF”) independence bonus – Distinction between self-governing 
territories and independent states under international law, para. 6 (June 8, 1979) reprinted at 
1979 UN JURID. YB 172-3 (“In view of the essential characteristics of independent 
States as described above, it follows that the status of the Cook Islands is not 
sovereign independence in the juridical sense.”). 
 67 See Agreement Concerning Air Services, July 12, 1990, Gov’t NZ-Gov’t 
Niue, 1865 U.N.T.S. ___, as amended, 320 U.N.T.S. 209, 217; 418 U.N.T.S. 161; 514 
U.N.T.S. 209; 740 U.N.T.S. 21; 893 U.N.T.S. 117; 958 U.N.T.S. 217; 1008 U.N.T.S. 
213; 1175 U.N.T.S. 297. 
 68 See Land & Marit. Boundary (Cameroon v Nigeria: Eq. Guinea, interv.) 
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Reps. 303, ¶ 33 (Oct. 10); W. Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 
I.C.J. Reps. 12 (May 22); Frontier Disp. (B. Faso / Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Reps. 
554 (Dec. 22); Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thai.), Merits, Judgment, 1962 
I.C.J. Reps. 6 (June 15); Rt of Passage Over Ind. Terr. (Port. v. Ind.), Merits, 
Judgment, 1960 I.C.J. Reps 6 (Apr. 12). 
 69 See Int’l L. Comm’n, Mohammed Bedjaoui, Spec. Rapp., Third report on 
succession in respect of matters other than treaties, Draft articles with commentaries on succession to 
public property, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/226 (Mar. 24, 1970); Int’l L. Comm’n, Humphrey 
Waldock, Spec. Rapp., Third report on succession in respect of treaties, U.N. Doc. 
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supported by states citing to colonial practice both in domestic 
practice70 and comments on drafts of the International Law 
Commission.71 
The conclusion from this section must be that non-
independent territories under imperial, colonial, mandated, or similar 
administration remained (or were ex post reincorporated as) separate 
legal persons, though without the status of statehood. The approach 
to their international participation as persons has been functional—
sometimes they are treated as persons vis-à-vis the colonial power, 
sometimes they can enter into agreements with third states, and 
sometimes they are considered parts of the metropolitan state. 
2. Occupied and Annexed States 
States that are occupied and possibly annexed are in a similar 
situation to those that were colonized. Quite a few states operated 
independently prior to an annexation or absorption into another state, 
and for some of these states their treaties continued to remain in force 
and might continue to be regarded as sovereign, independent states 
                                               
A/CN.4/224 & ADD.l, II YB INT’L L. COMM’N (1970), U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1970/Add.l; U.N. Secretariat, Succession of States to multilateral treaties: 
seventh study prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/225 (Apr. 24, 1970); U.N. 
Secretariat, Succession of States to bilateral treaties: study prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/229 (May 28, 1970); UN Secretariat, Possibilities of participation by the United 
Nations in international agreements on behalf of a territory, Study prepared by the Secretariat, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/281 (June 10, 1974), II(2) YB INT’L L. COMM’N (1974), U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1974/Add.l (Part 2). 
 70 See e.g. Nazar Mohammad & others v. The Crown, I Pakistan L. Reps. 19 
(1948), (High Ct. Lahore, Pakistan, 1948), reprinted at ANNUAL DIGEST Case 28 
(1948). 
 71 See Int’l L. Comm’n, 67th sess., Reply by Austria, U.N. Doc. A/69/10 
(Mar. 10, 2015), Statement by Ambassador Helmut Tichy, Legal Adviser, Austrian Ministry 
for European and International Affairs, New York, 29 October 2012 available at 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/sessions/67/pdfs/english/icil_austria.pdf&l
ang=E (citing Dralle v Czechoslovakia, Judgment, OGH 1 Ob 171/50, SZ 1950 No 
23/143, p 304-332, 17 ILR 155, 157-61 (Sup. Ct., Aust., May 10, 1950) (citing to 
practice of the Imperial Economic Conference of the British Empire of 1923 as 
evidence of customary international law); Int’l L. Comm’n, Michael Wood, Spec. 
Rapp., Second report on identification of customary international law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 
(May 22, 2014), ¶ 41. 
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despite their factual integration. For example, following its annexation 
by Germany and until 1955, Austria’s statehood was uncertain.72 Many 
authorities did not regard Austria as a state during this time, even 
though it retained some international capacity; for example, the 
capacity to negotiate the 1955 Austrian State Treaty.73 Similarly, the 
personality of the German Reich—technically occupied from 1945 
until the renunciation of allied powers in 1990—is unclear.74 It was not 
annexed,75 and the relationship is best characterized as one of agency.76 
Many authorities, including James Crawford, maintain that, in addition 
to the states of West and East Germany, some vestigial third Germany 
continued to exist in the form of the allied forces lingering rights over 
the conquered Reich.77 
The obvious distinction between these two cases of occupation 
of Austria and later Germany is the lawful use of force. In the case of 
Austria, the state was occupied by Germany and annexed under threat 
of the unlawful use of force, contrary to sovereignty and self-
determination. In the case of Germany at the end of World War II, the 
state was occupied due to the lawful use of force and was administered, 
not annexed. For the unlawful use of force, the rule of ex injuria jus non 
oritur78 works to preclude recognition of a change in the legal status of 
                                               
 72 See Customs Régime betw. Germ. & Aust. (Protocol of March 19th, 1931), 
Adv. Op., 1931 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 41 (Sept. 5). 
 73 See Jure Vidmar, Palestine and the Conceptual Problem of Implicit Statehood, 12 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 19 (2013). 
 74 See Agreement on the Settlement of Certain Matters Relating to Berlin, 
Sept. 25, 1990, Fr.-UK-US-USSR, reprinted at 30 INT’L L. MATS. 445; Exchange of 
Notes concerning the presence of allied troops in Berlin, Sep. 25, 1990, Fr.-UK-US-
USSR, reprinted at 30 INT’L L. MATS. 450; Ryszard W. Piotrowicz, The status of Germany 
in international law: Deutschland Uber Deutschland?, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 609 (1989). 
 75 See Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, reprinted at 94 INT’L L. 
REPS. 135; Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514 (1947); R. v. Bottrill, ex p Küchenmeister 
[1946] 1 All E.R. 635; CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 3, at 523–26; F. 
A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 634–59, 660–706 (1973); Jochen Abr. 
Frowein, The Reunification of Germany, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 152 (1992). 
 76 See BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 107; I. D. HENDRY & M.C. 
WOOD, THE LEGAL STATUS OF BERLIN (1987). 
 77 See R. v. Sec’y St. For. & Commonw. Aff’rs, ex parte Trawnik & Reimelt, 
[1985] T.L.R. 250. 
 78 See Accord. with Int’l L. of the Unilat. Decl. of Indep. in Resp. of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Reps. 141 ¶¶ 132–7 (July 22) (Cançado Trindade, J., 
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the territory.79 For the lawful use of force, the demands of self-
determination may similarly preclude an occupying force from 
annexing the territory.80 Yet despite these differences in legal status, in 
both cases, the factual situation is that the de facto independence of the 
                                               
separate opinion); Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Proj. (Hung./Slovak.), 1997 I.C.J. Reps. 7, 
54, 78 (Sept. 25); LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION, supra note 1, at 421. For ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio, see Mil. & Paramil. Acts. in & ag Nicar. (Nicar. v. US), 1986 I.C.J. 
Reps. 14, ¶ 270 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting); US Dipl. & Cons. Staff in Tehran 
(US v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Reps. 53–55, 62–63 (May 24) (Morozov & Tarazi, JJ., 
dissenting); Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. 
(ser.A/B), No. 70 (June 28); Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 
1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 81, ¶ 240 (June 28); Legal Status of E. Greenland (Den. v. 
Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 95 (Apr. 5) (Anzilotti, J., dissenting); Factory 
at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.) (Cl. for Indemnity) (Juris.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 
at 31 (July 26); Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Gr. v. UK), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 5 at 50 (Mar. 26). See generally William Thomas Worster, The Effect of Leaked 
Information on International Legal Norms, 28 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 443 (2013). 
 79 See Legal Conseq. of the Constr. of a Wall in the Occup. Palestinian Terr., 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Reps. 231 (Higgins, J., sep. op.); Legal Conseq. for Sts. 
of the Cont. Presence of S-Afr. in Namib. (SW Afr.) notwithst. S.C. Res. 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Reps. 16, 55–6 (June 21); E. Timor Case (Port. v. 
Aust’lia), Juris., Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Reps. 103–4; Int’l L. Comm’n, James 
Crawford, Spec. Rapp., Articles on State Responsibility, with Commentary, arts. 40, 41, in 
2001 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION FIFTY-THIRD SESSION, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 277-292, 289-290; LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION, supra note 1, 
at 421.; R. LANGER, SEIZURE OF TERRITORY 58 (1945); Enrico Milano, The non-
recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea: three different legal approaches and one unanswered 
question, 1 QS OF INT’L L. 35 (2014); M. Dawidowicz, The Obligation of Non-Recognition 
of an Unlawful Situation, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 683 (J. 
Crawford, A. Pellet, & S. Olleson eds, 2010); S. Talmon, The Duty Not to ‘Recognize as 
Lawful’ a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens 
Obligation: An Obligation without Real Substance?, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND 
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES OBLIGATIONS (C. Tomuschat & J.M. Thouvenin eds, 
2006); D. Turns, The Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition: Its Historical Genesis and Influence 
on Contemporary International Law, 2 CHIN. J INT’L L 105 (2003); W Meng, Stimson 
Doctrine, in IV MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 690 
(R. Bernhardt ed., 1982). 
 80 See E. Timor Case (Port. v. Aust’lia), Juris., Judgement, 1995 I.C.J. Reps. 
102; Legal Conseq. of the Constr. of a Wall in the Occup. Palestinian Terr., Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Reps. 231 (Kooijmans, J., sep. op.); S.C. Res. 217, ¶ 3 (Nov. 20, 
1965) (“no legal validity” for Southern Rhodesian declaration of independence); J. 
VIDMAR, DEMOCRATIC STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EMERGENCE 
OF NEW STATES IN POST-COLD WAR PRACTICE 40 (2013). 
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territory ceases, though the territory continues to retain its sovereign 
independence de jure. The de jure rights connected to sovereign 
independence are also retained. For example, the UN Security 
Council81 has received and considered submissions from annexed 
states on the unlawful use of force against them, despite the fact that 
were no longer de facto operating as independent states.82 
But that de jure status is not absolute. There are a number of 
functional matters where the acts of the unlawfully occupying state are 
recognized as valid legal acts of authority in the occupied state, most 
notably the “Namibia” exception. In the Namibia advisory opinion, the 
ICJ concluded that because South Africa was unlawfully occupying and 
controlling Namibia (South West Africa) contrary to the mandate over 
the territory, its actions there could not have any legal effect;83 
however, an exception should be made for the acts of state that were 
necessary for the inhabitants of the occupied territory to enjoy their 
rights, such as registration of births and marriages.84 These state acts 
would have de jure effect notwithstanding that the occupation generally 
                                               
 81 See U.N. Charter, arts. 11(2), 32, 35(2). UNSC Provisional Rules of 
Procedure, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.4 (1946), Rule 15 (only permitting states to 
participate in UNSC sessions). In addition, the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice permits non-UN members to submit their disputes to the ICJ even if they 
decide against membership in the UN by lodging a declaration to that effect with the 
Court. This method was used by several micro-states to join the Court without 
joining the UN, and in the case of Liechtenstein to actually lodge disputes with the 
Court. See e.g. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 2d phase, 1955 I.C.J. 
Reps. 4 (Apr. 6). However, in these cases, the applicants were undoubtedly states 
when they sought to lodge their declarations with the Court. See id. at 20 (“It is for 
Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the 
rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality . . . “). 
 82 See UNSCOR 181st mtg. at 1940 (Aug. 12, 1947) (re Indonesia); THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 609, 612–3 (Bruno Simma, 
ed., 2d ed. 2002) (re Tunisia and Kuwait). 
 83 See Legal Conseq. for Sts. of the Cont. Presence of S-Afr. in Namib. (SW 
Afr.) notwithst. S.C. Res. 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Reps. 16, 55-6 
(June 21); Cyprus v. Turk. Judgment (Merits) (ser. A) No 4, 5 (Eur. Ct. Hum Rts., 
May 10, 2001). 
 84 See Legal Conseq. for Sts. of the Cont. Presence of S-Afr. in Namib. (SW 
Afr.) notwithst. S.C. Res. 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Reps. 16, 55–6 
(June 21). 
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did not.85 The Namibia exception is applied to a variety of other 
unlawful regimes, and is not limited to only Namibia.86 
3. Internationalized Territories 
Some occupied territories were not meant to be annexed or 
colonized, but shifted to international governance, and here again we 
find the inconsistent application of functional statehood. In some 
cases, territories under international administration were treated as if 
they were states, and in others, they were treated as if they remained 
part of other states, though with their local governance administered 
by international authorities. While, we will might guess that this 
distinction would fall on whether the territory was a part of another 
state or was an independent state upon the creation of its international 
administration, this easy distinction does not appear to be the rule. For 
example, the Saarland was clearly an internationalized territory with 
mere autonomy within Germany,87 yet it was authorized to join the 
Council of Europe (though it never took that step) even though only 
states may join the organization. This approach has also been applied 
                                               
 85 See id. 
 86 See id.; Hopkins v. Mex., 4 U.N. REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 41 (1926); R. 
(on the application of Kibris Turk Hava Yollari) v Secretary of State for Transport, 
Case No: CO/3512/2007 [2009] EWHC 1918 (Admin); [2010] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 
253 (QB, Engl., Admin. Ct., July 28, 2009); Emin v Yeldag [2002] 1 F.L.R. 956; B v 
B (Divorce: N. Cyprus) [2000] 2 F.L.R. 707 [2001] 3 F.C.R. 331; Somalia v 
Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA (The Mary) (QB, Engl., Commercial Ct., 
Mar. 13, 1992); Reel v Holder, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) June 30, 1981 [1981] 
1 W.L.R. 1226; [1981] 3 All E.R. 321; (1981) 125 S.J. 585; (interpreting the meaning 
of “country” under International Amateur Athletic Federation rules as territory over 
which there is authority, not necessarily the same as the meaning of state or nation); 
Hesperides Hotels Limited v Aegean Turkish Holidays Limited [1978] 1 QB 205; In 
re Al-Fin Corporation’s Patent, [1970] Ch. 160, 177-81 (Apr. 2, 1969); Luigi Monta 
of Genoa v Cechofracht Co [1956] 2 QB 552; [1956] 3 WLR 480 (QB Div., Jun. 14, 
1956) (Sellers, J.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 205(3) (1987). 
 87 See European Convention on Human Rights, art. 59(1)-(2) (Convention 
shall be open to the signature of the members of the Council of Europe); Statute of 
the Council of Europe, London, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103 (1951), CETS No. 1, 
art. 4 (“[a]ny European State . . . may be invited to become a member of the Council 
of Europe by the Committee of Ministers”). The Saar was admitted as a member of 
the Council of Europe (as a European “state”), and thus eligible to be a member of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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in the cases of Danzig88 and Trieste,89 as well as in Bosnia,90 Kosovo91 
and East Timor, before those entities were fully accepted as states.92 
However, even when the territorial entity was clearly a state 
prior to the internationalization, we still find a functional approach due 
to the unusual nature of its internationalized government. An example 
of this practice is the case of Cambodia.93 What confuses the statehood 
issue is whether the international organization governing the territory, 
the UN, is acting as the government of the state and thus exercising 
statehood, or whether it is exercising the international organization’s 
personality. The UN is not sovereign, although it can act on behalf of 
the territory, asserting the personality of the territory, distinct from that 
of the UN.94 It is widely understood that, although the UN is not a 
                                               
 88 See Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, art. 71(2) 
(treating the City of Danzig as a state); CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 
3, at 31. 
 89 See S.C. Res. 16, Permanent Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste (1947). 
 90 See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(“Dayton Agreement”), Dec. 14, 1995, Ann. 10, reprinted at 35 INT’L L. MATS. 75. 
 91 See S.C. Res. 1244 (1999) (authorizing the UNSG to create the UN 
Mission in Kosovo “UNMIK”); KOSOVO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: 
A LEGAL ASSESSMENT (C. Tomuschat ed., 2002); Bernhard Knoll, From Benchmarking 
to Final Status? Kosovo and the Problem of an International Administration’s Open-Ended 
Mandate, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 637 (2005); Alexandros Yannis, The UN as Government in 
Kosovo, 10 GLOBAL GOV. 67 (2004); Matthias Ruffert, The Administration of Kosovo and 
East Timor by the International Community, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 613 (2001). 
 92 See S.C. Res. 1272 (1999) (authorizing the UNSG to create the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor “UNTAET”). See also S.C Res. 1292; S.C. 
Res. 1388 (2001); S.C. Res. 1410 (2002). 
 93 See Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlements Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 12-25 (1993). 
 94 See S.C. Res. 1244 (1999) (UNMIK will exercise “[a]ll legislative and 
executive authority with respect to Kosovo”); S.C. Res. 1272 (1999) (UNTAET will 
be “endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and . . . 
empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including 
administration of justice.”); A. Yannis, The UN as Government in Kosovo, 10 GLOBAL 
GOV. 67 (2004); UNMIK, Press Rel., SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen and Walter 
Schwimmer, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Sign Two Agreements 
(Aug. 23, 2004) (signing an agreement for an independent committee of experts from 
the Council of Europe to monitor treatment of detainees in conformity with the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment of Punishment). This kind of relationship is comparable to that of the 
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party to human rights treaties, it may incur those obligations where it 
exercises governmental administration.95 Furthermore, it is not always 
clear whether those human rights obligations are binding because the 
UN is bound to them under customary international law, or because 
the territory it is administering as some sort of continuing legal person, 
remains bound.96 In such cases it may be clear that the UN administers 
the government of an entity capable of having its own government,97 
although it may not be entirely clear whether the governmental powers 
come from the inherent, independent governmental authority of the 
entity or whether they come from the state that claims the entity.98 
Some of these territories under international administration have had 
their practice cited as “state practice” and thus evidence of customary 
                                               
Holy See governing the Vatican City State. Only the latter is a state; the former is a 
different kind of international legal person. 
 95 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS 
CUSTOMARY LAW (Thedor Meron ed., 1989); Int’l L. Assoc., Hum. Rts. Comm., Final 
report on the status of the universal declaration of human rights in national and international law, 
Report of the 66th Int’l L. Assoc. Conf. 525-63 (1994); Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, 
Claims Against International Organisations: quis custodiet ipsos custodies, 7 YALE J. WORLD 
PUBL. ORDER 131, 134 (1981) (“[b]ecause international organisations were created 
to promote public order, it would be perverse, even destructive, to postulate 
community expectation that international organisations need to conform to the 
principles of public order.”); Elihu Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United 
Kingdom in the Field of International Law, 9 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 253 (1960). Regarding 
the League of Nations, see W.H. DAWSON, THE SAAR TERRITORY: ITS HISTORY, 
POPULATION, INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 18–20 
(1934). 
 96 See HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 
(Thedor Meron ed., 1989); Int’l L. Assoc., Hum. Rts. Comm., Final report on the status 
of the universal declaration of human rights in national and international law, Report of the 
66th Int’l L. Assoc. Conf. 525–63 (1994). 
 97 See S.C. Res. 1264 (1999); S.C. Res. 1272 (1999); Dayton Agreement, Dec. 
14, 1995, Ann. 10, reprinted at 35 INT’L L. MATS. 75 (regarding the UN mission in 
Bosnia); Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement in Cambodia, Oct. 23, 
1991, reprinted at 31 INT’L L. MATS. 183 (regarding the UN transitional authority in 
Cambodia); Agreement concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), 1962, Neths.-
Indo., reprinted at 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 493 (1963). 
 98 See S.C. Res. 1244 (1999); UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General on United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/1999/779 (July 12, 1999); 
UNMIK Reg. No. 1999/1, § 1(1) (suggesting that there is a legislative, executive, and 
judicial power of Kosovo, as distinct from Serbia, to be administered). 
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international law.99 It would seem that the very act of claiming 
administration by the UN presupposes an inherent and independent 
source of governmental authority in the entity at issue that could be 
vested in the international organization.100 Thus, internationalized 
territories are often viewed as distinct international legal persons, at 
least for certain purposes. 
4. Entities in Transition 
States in transition to independence are yet further examples 
of entities that are treated as if they are states prior to being widely 
considered as such.101 Some quasi-states in transition to becoming 
states have joined as members of international organizations, before 
their statehood was widely accepted.102 While they eventually received 
widespread recognition as states, at the time when they joined the 
organization, their statehood was still in doubt. Treating an entity that 
                                               
 99 See William Thomas Worster, The Contribution to Customary International Law 
by Territories under International Administration, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
AND FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jean d’Aspremont & 
Sufyan Droubi eds., forthcoming 2020). 
 100 For a discussion on the similar case of the US relationship with Puerto 
Rico, cf. Puerto Rico v Sanchez Valle et al., No. 15-108, __ US ___, (2016) with id. at 
Breyer, J., dissenting op. 
 101 See CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 3, at 394; Robert J. 
Delahunty & John Yoo, Statehood and the Third Geneva Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 
131, 141 (2005) (“such as the state of Poland, which the Allied Governments had 
recognized as a belligerent before the Armistice with Germany in the First World 
War, but which the Central Powers did not recognize as a state.”). 
 102 See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 199–200 (6th ed., 2008) 
(arguing that Israel was admitted to the UN prematurely); JOHN DUGARD, 
RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 52–5 (1987) (discussing Byelorussia, 
India, Lebanon, Namibia, the Philippines, Syria, and the Ukraine); W. MICHAEL 
REISMAN, PUERTO RICO AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS 61–2 (1975) (arguing 
that Bhutan was not independent of India when it was admitted); ROSALYN 
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE 
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 16–7 (1963) ; Roger O’Keefe, The 
Admission to the United Nations of the Ex-Soviet and Ex-Yugoslav States, 1 BALTIC Y.B. 
INT’L L. 167, 171–6 (2001); UNSG, Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as 
Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev. 1, ¶ 79 (1999) (“W]hen 
a treaty is open to ‘States’, how is the Secretary-General to determine which entities 
are States? If they are Members of the United Nations or Parties to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, there is no ambiguity.”). 
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is on the path to statehood, though not yet fully attained such status, 
as if it were already a state, is yet another example of treating a non-
state territorial entity as if it were a state for a functional purpose. 
Several examples of states undertaking a long birthing process 
that are commonly overlooked are the British Commonwealth states. 
Canada evolved from a dominion, only becoming fully responsible for 
its constitution in 1982,103 though it was functionally treated as a state 
far earlier.104 Australia also evolved from a part of the empire to an 
                                               
 103 See Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 pmbl, ¶ 2 (U.K.) (renouncing any residual 
legislative authority of the United Kingdom’s parliament to enact amendments to the 
Canadian Constitution and, thus, patriating the Canadian Constitution). See also 
British North America Act (No. 2), 1975, 23 & 24 Eliz. II, c. 53 (U.K.); British North 
America Act (No. 1), 1975, 23 & 24 Eliz. II, c. 28 (U.K.); British North America Act, 
1974, 23 Eliz. II , c. 13 (U.K.); British North America Act, 1965, 14 Eliz. 11, c. 4 
(U.K.); British North America Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 304 (Can.); British North America 
(No. 2) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 81 (U.K.) (repealed); British North America 
Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 22 (U.K.); British North America Act, 1946, 9 & 
10 Geo. VI, c. 63 (U.K.) (repealed); British North America Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 
VI, c. 30 (U.K.) (repealed); British North America Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo. VI, c. 36 
(U.K.); Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4, arts. 2(2)-(4) (U.K.) 
(providing Canada (and other “Dominions”) the power to legislate independently 
from England and extraterritorially); Constitution Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 26 
(U.K.); British North America Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. V, c. 45 (U.K.); British North 
America Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 11 (U.K.); British North America Act, 1886, 49 & 
50 Vict. c. 35 (U.K.); British North America Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 28 (U.K.); 
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (U.K.); Constitution Act, 1791, 31 Geo. 3, 
c. 31 (U.K.) (establishing the Canadian government). 
 104 See e.g. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, 
Can.-UK, 1980 Can. T.S. No. 25; Agreement on the Establishment of Direct 
Diplomatic Relations, Can.-USSR, 1942 Can. T.S. No. 12; Agreement Providing for 
the Exchange of Consuls, Ca.-USSR, 1942 Can. T.S. No. 9; R. v. Sec’y St. For. & 
Commwlth Afr’rs, ex parte Ind. Assoc. of Alberta & others, [1982] Q.B. 892 (Ct. 
Appeal, Engl., Jan. 28, 1982) aff’d (H. Lords, Mar. 11, 1982) reprinted at 78 INT’L L. 
REPS. 421; US DEP’T OF ST., OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, A Guide to the United States’ 
History of Recognition, Diplomatic,, and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: Canada, 
available at http://history.state.gov/countries/canada (“The Dominion of Canada 
formed in 1867, but as an integral part of the British Empire its foreign relations 
remained under the control of London. Over the next six decades Canada gradually 
won greater control over its external affairs . . . American and Canadian government 
officials increasingly interacted through joint commissions and military cooperation, 
and the two governments even negotiated a bilateral fisheries treaty in 1923. It was 
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independent state. Even as late as 1906, there was no such thing as 
Australian nationality.105 New Zealand similarly did not generally 
negotiate treaties independently from the UK until 1928,106 yet it 
adhered to the Versailles Treaty as a separate person in 1918. Only in 
1973 did New Zealand adopt its own constitution,107 and in 1976 a 
New Zealand court ruled that New Zealand was not “part of Her 
Majesty’s dominions” or a “British possession,” at least for purposes 
of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (UK). Finally, it was only in 1986 
that the residual power of the British Parliament to legislate for New 
Zealand was abolished.108 During the years of these emerging 
independences, some authorities thought that when the UK declared 
war, that decision was binding on all nations in the empire, but others 
thought that the nations should be consulted in the decision.109 While 
                                               
not until 1926 [after the Balfour Declaration at the 1926 British Imperial 
Conference], however, that the United Kingdom acknowledged that Canada was 
fully autonomous in the conduct of its foreign affairs . . . [the Balfour Declaration 
stated that Dominions] “are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, 
equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic 
or external affairs.”) 
 105 See A.-G. (Cth) v Ah Sheung [1906] HCA 44; (1906) 4 CLR 949 (High 
Ct., Aust’lia, June 29, 1906); Nolan v Min. Immig. & Ethnic Aff’rs [1988] HCA 45; 
(1988) 165 CLR 178, F.C. 88/041 (High Ct., Aust’lia, Sep. 13, 1988) (recognizing 
only in 1988 that Australian nationality was distinct from British nationality); 
Australian Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1984 (ending the status of “British 
subject”). 
 106 See STEVE HOADLEY, THE NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
HANDBOOK 17 (1992). 
 107 See New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 1973. 
 108 See Constitution Act 1986; Re Ashman & Best [1985] 2 NZLR 224, 232 
(SC); PHILIP A. JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW 
ZEALAND 459 (2001). 
 109 See New Zealand Parliament 1923, Parliamentary Debates, 199 Hansard 
23 (Sinclair) (“It goes without saying that, as before the signing of the [Versailles] 
treaty, so since, if the Mother-country were at war the dominions would be at war. 
But by acquiring a voice upon foreign policy the dominions are under a responsibility 
that they were not under before. Is this voice, about which so much has been written 
and spoken, a real voice? . . . I submit that it is inadequate—that it does not cover 
the ground; that the machinery for its exercise is defective.”); Id. at 33-34 (Bell) 
(“There is one Government of the Empire in its relation to foreign affairs, and that 
is the Government of England . . . The matter that concerns us is how far it is of any 
benefit to anyone that we should be consulted; and, if we were consulted, is there 
any man in New Zealand who thinks that we are really fit to judge? By “we” I mean 
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the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and Statute of Westminster of 1932 
of the UK expressed an understanding that the various territories were 
“autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, 
in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic 
and external affairs,”110 it took another 50 years to sever the remaining 
sovereign ties. 
Andorra is yet another problematic transitional entity,111 with 
its statehood not clearly established until 1993 when it adopted its first 
constitution and became a “modern” state.”112 Andorra was generally 
reluctant to adhere to treaties or join international organizations until 
after the confirmation of its statehood in 1993,113 although it did enter 
                                               
Government. I am quite sure the Opposition would say that we are unfit. I am a 
member of the Government myself, and I have no sense of fitness to advise the 
Imperial Government in matters of foreign policy.”). 
 110 See Peter Marshall, The Balfour Formula and the Evolution of the Commonwealth, 
App., 90 THE ROUND TABLE 541, 550. (2001); R. O. McGechan, Legislative Inability, 
in NEW ZEALAND AND THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER: FIVE LECTURES 78 (J. C. 
Beaglehole ed., 1944). 
 111 See Michael Emerson, Andorra and the European Union, Report for the 
Centre for European Policy Studies 37–9 (2007) available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/32605/1/44._Andorra_and_the_European_Union.pdf. 
 112 See Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Co-operation, 1993, 
And.-Fr.-Sp., 1872 U.N.T.S. 195 (recognizing Andorra as a sovereign state); 
Emerson, Andorra and the EU, supra note 272 (“The Constitution declares Andorra 
to be a legal, independent, democratic and social state, whose sovereignty resides in 
the Andorran people.”). 
 113 For international organizations, see UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (July 23, 1993); UN (July 28, 1993); UNESCO (Oct. 20, 
1993); International Telecommunications Union (Nov. 12, 1993); World 
Organisation for Intellectual Property (July 28, 1994); Council of Europe (Nov. 10, 
1994); EUTELSAT (Dec. 2, 1994); World Tourist Organisation (Oct. 17, 1995); 
Organisation for European Security and Cooperation (OSCE) (Apr. 25, 1996); 
International Office for Animal Health (Jan. 3, 1997); World Health Organisation 
(WHO) (Jan. 15, 1997); World Trade Organisation (WTO) (observer) (Oct. 22, 
1997); Organisation for International Civil Aviation (Feb. 25, 2001); International 
Criminal Court (Apr. 30, 2001); Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) (Mar. 29, 2003); International Organisation of the Francophonie (IOF) 
(associate member) (Nov. 26, 2004). Unlike the Saar, Andorra refrained from joining 
the Council of Europe until its statehood was settled, see Accession of Andorra, Nov. 
10, 1994, 1862 U.N.T.S. 456. For treaties, see e.g. Mine Ban Convention, supra note 
45; Illicit Drug Traffic Convention, supra note 232. 
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into treaties with Spain, 114 joined Interpol,115 and adhered to the 
Universal Copyright Convention, the Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,116 and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child117 prior to then. During this 
awkward period spanning many centuries, the entity was not a part of 
Spain or France, but was also not foreign to them either, in that their 
relationship did not fall into the normal category of interstate relations. 
In 1992, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) struggled 
to view the entity as a “European country,” rather than a “state.”118 
Since Andorra has now clearly established (or normalized) its 
statehood, we might forget that its status was questionable for so long, 
and during this time was treated as having a relative statehood 
permitting it to adhere to several treaty regimes on a case-by-case 
functional basis.119 
The EU might be another sui generis entity in transition.120 The 
EU entity and legal system is not adequately described using the 
                                               
 114 See Convention, June 16, 1841, And.–Sp., 91 C.T.S. 473; Exchange of 
Notes relative to the Importation of Cattle, July 13, 1867, And.-Sp., 135 CTS 201. 
 115 See International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) (Nov. 27, 1987). 
 116 See Drozd & Janousek v. Fr. & Sp., Appl. No. 12747/87, Judgment (Eur. 
Ct. Hum. Rts., Plenary, June 26, 1992). 
 117 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
 118 See Statute of the Council of Europe, London, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 
103, C.E.T.S. No. 1, art. 4; Drozd & Janousek v. Fr. & Sp., Appl. No. 12747/87, 
Judgment (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Plenary, June 26, 1992). 
 119 But see Fred Halliday, Andorra’s Model: Time for Change, OPEN DEMOCRACY 
(Sept. 28, 2009) available at 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/andorra (expressing the view that that 
Nichloas Sarkozy used his position as co-Prince of Andorra to pursue a political 
objective of France, i.e. tax evasion by French citizens hiding money in Andorra, 
which resulted in Andorra legislation and a tax data sharing agreement with France, 
perhaps implying that the sovereign independence of Andorra might be simply be a 
cover for acting as a political tool of France). 
 120 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 199; Illicit Drug Traffic Convention, supra 
note 232; Bruno De Witte, The European Union as an International Legal Experiment, in 
THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 20 (2012); Ramses A. Wessel, 
Reconsidering the Relationship between International and EU Law: Towards a Content-based 
Approach?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 10 (Enzo 
Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti & Ramses A. Wessel eds., 2011); Dominic McGoldrick, 
The International Legal Personality of the European Community and the European Union, in 50 
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language of statehood.121 Some authorities see it as closer to an 
international organization,122 being clearly founded on a treaty. 
However, other authorities, including the EU Court of Justice, appear 
to take a more constitutional view.123 Quite simply, the EU has 
“differing levels of status . . . in multilateral fora.”124 Its obligations can 
                                               
YEARS OF THE EUROPEAN TREATIES LOOKING BACK AND THINKING FORWARD 
(Michael Dougan & Samantha Currie eds., 2009); Frank Hoffmeister, Outsider or 
Frontrunner? Recent Developments under International and European Law on the Status of the 
European Union in International Organisations and Treaty Bodies, 44 COMM. MKT L. REV. 
41 (2007); Frank Hoffmeister & Piet Jan Kuiper, The Status of the EU at the United 
Nations: Institutional Ambiguities and Political Realities, in THE UN AND THE EU - AN 
EVER STRONGER PARTNERSHIP (Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister & Tom Ruys eds., 
2006); Michael Dougan, Sources, Supremacy and Direct Effect of Community Law, in 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 132 (Derrick Wyatt & Alan Dashwood eds., 5th ed. 2004); 
J.H.H Weiler & Ulrich Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order - Through the 
Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 420 (1996). 
 121 See C. Rumford, Rethinking the state and polity-building in the European Union: 
the sociology of globalization and the rise of reflexive government, 4 CENTR. EUR. POL. COMMS., 
WORKING PAPER SER. 3, 14 (2003). 
 122 See Agreement on the free movement of persons, EU & EU MS – Switz., 
O.J. (L. 114), 6 (Apr. 2002); Theodor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community Legal 
Order: An Analysis of Possible Foundations, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 389, 403 et seq. (1996). 
 123 See Op. 2/13, ¶ 158, 153–177 (Eur. Ct. Just., Dec. 18, 2014); Op. 2/94, 
Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ¶¶ 34–5 (Eur. Ct. Just., Mar. 28, 1996). 
Op. 1/91 (Eur. Ct. Just., Dec. 14, 1991); Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v 
Eur. Parl., – 23 (Eur. Ct. Just., 1986) (the European Community/Union is a ‘legal 
community’ whose Treaty is a ‘constitutional charter’); Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel 
Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?, 36 
COMM. MKT. L. REV. 703 (1999); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a 
Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1981); Willem Maas, Unrespected, 
Unequal, Hollow? Contingent Citizenship and Reversible Rights in the European Union, 15 
COLUMBIA J. EUR. L. 265, 279 (2009). 
 124 See Treaty on European Union, art. 6(2), O.J.C. 326/13 (Oct. 26, 2012); 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 189(3), 220(1), O.J.C. 
326/47 (Oct. 26, 2012); Jan Wouters, Jed Odermatt, & Thomas Ramopoulos, The 
Status of the European Union at the United Nations General Assembly, in THE EUROPEAN 
UNION IN THE WORLD: LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR MARC MARESCEAU (I. 
Govaere, P. Van Elsuweghe, E. Lannon, S. Adam eds., 2013); Jan Wouters, S. van 
Kerckhoven & Thomas Ramopoulos, The EU and the Euro Area in International 
Economic Governance: The Case of the IMF, in THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SHAPING OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (F. Amtenbrink & D. Kochenov eds, 2013). 
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have supremacy125 or direct effect in member states.126 EU law is a 
hybrid of international and constitutional legal order: sometimes the 
international law paradigm explains the system better,127 but at others, 
the domestic, constitutional legal analogy is more appropriate.128 
                                               
 125 See Op. 2/13, ¶ 158; see further ¶¶ 153–77. (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case 11/70, 
Int’le Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel, ¶ 3. (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case C-6/64, Costa v ENEL (Eur. Ct. Just.). 
 126 See Case C-26/62, Van Gend & Loos v Administratie der Belastingen, 
12. (Eur. Ct. Just., Feb. 5, 1963). 
 127 See C-481/13 Mohammad Ferooz Qurbani, ¶¶ 23 et seq. (Eur. Ct. Just., 
July 17, 2014); Case C-366/10 Air Trans. Assoc. Am. v Sec’y St. Energy & Climate 
Change, ¶ 101 (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case C-364/10 Hung. v Slovak., ¶ 44 (Eur. Ct. Just.); 
Case C-70/09 Hengartner & Gassner v Landesregierung Vorarlberg, ¶ 36 (Eur. Ct. 
Just.); Case C-386/08 Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, ¶ et seq (Eur. 
Ct. Just.); Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, ¶¶ 39, 48, 53 (Eur. Ct. 
Just.); Case C-308/06 Intertanko et al. v Sec’y St. Trans., ¶ 49 (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case 
C-200/02 Chen v Sec’y St. Home Dep’t, ¶ 37 (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case C-377/98 Neths. 
v Eur. Parl. & Council EU (Directive on Biotechnological Inventions) ¶ 55 (Eur. Ct. 
Just.); Case C-162/96 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz, ¶ 55 (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case T-
115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case C-286/90 
Ankagemyndigheden v Poulsen & Diva Navigation Corp, ¶ (Eur. Ct. Just.); Joined 
Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-129/85 Ahlström Oy v Comm’n (Eur. Ct. Just.); 
Case 104/81 Kupferberg v Hauptzollamt Mainz, ¶ (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case 42/74 Van 
Duyn v Home Off., ¶ 22 (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belg., ¶ 5 (Eur. 
Ct. Just.); Joint Cases 21-24/72 Int’l Fruit Co. NV v Produktschap Voor Groenten 
en Fruit, ¶¶ 110 et seq (Eur. Ct. Just.). 
 128 See Op. 2/13, ¶ 158 (Eur. Ct. Just., Dec. 18, 2014); Case C-118/07 
Comm’n v Fin. (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case C-205/06 Comm’n v Aust., ¶ 36 et seq (Eur. 
Ct. Just.); Case C-249/06 Comm’n v Swed. (Eur. Ct. Just.); Joined Cases C-
402&415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Fdn. v Council & Comm’n 
EU, ¶ 317 (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case C-62/98 Comm’n v Port. (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case C-
53/96 Hermès Int’l v FHT Mkting Choice BV, ¶ 28 (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case C-61/94 
Comm’n v Germ. (“International Dairy Arrangement”), ¶ 52. (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case 
C-473/93 Comm’n v Lux. (Eur. Ct. Just.); Case C-6/64, Costa v ENEL, 587 at 
593(Eur. Ct. Just.); ANDREW WILLIAMS, EU HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES. A STUDY IN 
IRONY 145-57 (2004); Ramses A. Wessel, Reconsidering the Relationship between 
International and EU Law: Towards a Content-based Approach?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 7, 10 (Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti & 
Ramses A. Wessel eds., 2011); Katja S. Ziegler, International Law and EU law: Between 
Asymmetric Constitutionalisations and Fragmentation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
THEORY AND HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (Alexander Orakhelashvili ed., 
2011); Nikolaos Lavranos, Protecting European Law from International Law, 15 EUR. FOR. 
AFF’RS REV. 265, 279 (2010); Bruno de Witte, International Law as a Tool for the 
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Increasingly the union is taking a lead in border control which makes 
“the EU behave like a territorial state.”129 While in the past, its legal 
personality was subject to some debate, today that issue appears to be 
settled by the Lisbon treaty.130 However, the quality of that personality 
fluctuates depending on a functional assessment of the issue at hand. 
Here we shift from states that may be emerging through 
consensual processes to non-consensual processes, and where issues 
of adversarial self-determination become relevant. It would appear that 
where a local population, distinct from the majority of the state, can 
qualify as a people and accrue the right to self-determination, that 
population may acquire the additional right to external self-
determination, potentially even secession, as a last resort.131 However, 
even in the adversarial self-determination context, we still see a similar 
approach to functional statehood as we did in the consensual context. 
Kosovo presents a good example. There were considerable 
diplomatic communications by the US urging states to recognize 
Kosovo,132 to permit it to operate as a state (e.g. by joining the World 
                                               
European Union, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 265 (2009); Koen Lenaerts & Eddy de 
Smijter, The European Union as an Actor in International Law, 19 YB EUR. L. 95 (1999). 
 129 See CEC (2002) Proposal for a comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration 
and trafficking of human beings in the European Union, OJ C 142: 23–36; M. Foucault, 
Questions of Method, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT (G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller 
eds.,1991); T. Snyder, The wall around the west, EUROZINE (Jan. 6, 2005) available at 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2005-01-06-snyder-en.html. 
 130 See e.g. Agreement on Extradition, June 25, 2003, EU-US, T.I.A.S. 10–
201; Agreement on mutual legal assistance, June 25, 2003, EU-US, T.I.A.S. 10–201.1. 
 131 See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 
(Dec. 14, 1960); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); The Aaland Islands Question: 
Report Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of 
Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7/21/68/106 (1921); ANTONIO CASSESSE, 
SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES - A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 119 (1995). 
 132 See US DEP’T ST.., Cable No. 07-BUCHAREST-978 (Aug. 27, 2007); US 
DEP’T ST., Cable No. 08-BEIJING-2610 (Jul. 2, 2008); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 08-
TOKYO-569 (Mar. 4, 2008); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-NEWDELHI-1291 (Feb. 
17, 2009); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-STATE-63696 (June 19, 2009); US DEP’T ST., 
Cable No. 09-LUSAKA-105 (Feb. 18, 2009) (reporting on US lobbying Zambia to 
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Bank133) and to support independence during the ICJ advisory opinion 
proceedings.134 The US recognized Kosovo as a state when its status 
was still unclear.135 Kosovo’s international relations have also been in 
transition. Initially the UN Mission in Kosovo (“UNMIK”) conducted 
Kosovo’s governance and international relations. This governance 
included signing international agreements136 as well as representing the 
                                               
recognize Kosovo); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-KUWAIT-736 (July 22, 2009) 
(reporting on meeting with Kuwaiti Foreign Minister regarding Kosovo and noting 
that Kuwait will “eventually” recognize Kosovo); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-
KUWAIT-376 (Apr. 16, 2009) (adding that this effort was supported by German, 
British, French and Italian embassies); Tatjana Papić, Fighting for a Seat at the Table: 
International Representation of Kosovo, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 543 (2013). 
 133 See US DEP’T St., Cable No. 09-HARARE-460 (June 2, 2009) (reporting 
on US lobbying Zimbabwe on behalf of Kosovo for membership in the World 
Bank); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-SANJOSE-360 (Apr. 29, 2009) US DEP’T ST., 
Cable No. 09-SANJOSE-321 (Apr. 17, 2009) (reporting on US lobbying Costa Rica 
on behalf of Kosovo for membership in the World Bank); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 
09-STATE-39345 (Apr. 21, 2009) (stating US DOS position that Kosovo 
independence must be supported by countering opposition to membership in 
international organizations); INT’L MONETARY FUND, Kosovo Becomes the International 
Monetary Fund’s 186th Member, Press Rel. No. 09/240 (June 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09240.htm; Press Rel., WORLD 
BANK, Kosovo Joins World Bank Group Institutions, Press Rel. No. 
2009/448/ECA (June 29, 2009), available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:2223
0081~menuPK:34463~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html. 
 134 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-STATE-90199 (requiring posts to urge 
host states to intervene on behalf of Kosovo in ICJ advisory opinion proceedings); 
US Dep’t St., Cable No. 08-NEWDELHI-2370 (Sept. 4, 2008). 
 135 See US DEP’T OF ST., OF. OF THE HISTORIAN, A Guide to the United States’ 
History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: Kosovo, 
available at http://history.state.gov/countries/kosovo (“The United States formally 
recognized Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state on February 18.”). Also see 
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 123 (3d ed., 2010) (noting that Bosnia remains 
divided between the Muslim-Croat federation and Republika Srpska, and that each 
of these has “separate government structures, schools, and economies”). However, 
the northern part of Kosovo largely continues to function as a de facto state, see id. at 
298–9. 
 136 See Free Trade Agreement, reprinted at U.N. Doc. S/2006/906 (Nov. 20, 
2006); Investment Protection Agreement, reprinted at U.N. Doc. S/2006/361 (June 
5, 2006); Agreement on Medical/Dental University Education Kosovo-Maced., 
reprinted at U.N. Doc. S/2005/335 (May 23, 2005); Agreement on Medical/Dental 
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territory at international organizations,137 while the EU assisted with 
police, judiciary and customs operation.138 Following the declaration of 
                                               
University Education, Alb.-Kosovo, reprinted at U.N. Doc. S/2005/335 (May 23, 
2005); MOU, Nov. 16, 2004, Swed.-UNMIK, reprinted at SÖ2005: 29, available at 
www.government.se/content/1/c6/06/54/92/3e4fbd17.pdf; Agreement on 
technical arrangements related to the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Aug. 23, 2004, 
Council Eur.-UNMIK, available at www.cpt.coe.int/documents/srb/2004-08-23-
eng.pdf; Agreement on technical arrangements related to the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Aug. 23, 2004, Council Eur.-
UNMIK, available at 
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/6_Resources/PDF_Agreement_UN
MIK_en.pdf; Agreement on Elimination of Double Taxation, Alb.-Kosovo, reprinted 
at U.N. Doc. S/2004/907 (Jan. 17, 2004); Exchange of Letters addressing the 
Practical Modalities Associated with the Opening of Two Temporary Local Crossing 
Points Kosovo-Maced., reprinted at U.N. Doc. S/2003/675 (June 26, 2003); 
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) on Economic Cooperation, Alb.-
Kosovo, reprinted at U.N.. Doc. S/2002/1126 (Oct. 9, 2002); MOU on Police 
Cooperation, Alb.-Kosovo, reprinted at U.N. Doc. S/2002/1126 (Oct. 9, 2002); MOU 
on Motor Vehicle Insurance, Alb.-Kosovo, reprinted at U.N. Doc. S/2002/1126 (Oct. 
9, 2002); Exchange of Letters on International Panel of Judges in Kosovo for KLA 
Member Crimes Committed in FYROM, Kosovo-Maced., reprinted at U.N. Doc. 
S/2002/779 (July 17, 2002); MOU on Custom Cooperation, Kosovo-Maced., 
reprinted at U.N. Doc. S/2000/878 (Sept. 18, 2000). 
 137 See Council Eur. ACFC, Report, Doc. ACFC(2008)001 (Dec. 10, 2008) 
available at 
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_UNMIK_Progr
essReport_en.pdf; Council Eur. ACFC, Report, Doc. ACFC(2005)003 (June 2, 2005) 
available at 
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_1st_Report_Ko
sovo_en.pdf; Council Eur., CPT, Report, Doc. CPT/Inf (2011) (Oct. 6, 2009) 
available at www.cpt.coe.int/documents/srb/2011-27-inf-en.pdf; Council Eur., CPT, 
Report, Doc. CPT/Inf (2009) (Jan. 20, 2009) available at 
www.cpt.coe.int/documents/srb/2009-04-inf-eng.pdf; Hum. Rts. Comm., Report, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UNK/1 (Mar. 13, 2006); UNSC, U.N. Doc. S/2006/906 (Nov. 
20, 2006); UNSC, U.N. Doc. S/2006/45 (Jan. 25, 2006) (Meeting with UNESCO); 
U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2005/335 (May 23, 2005); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2005/88 
(Feb. 14, 2005); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2004/907 (Jan. 17, 2004); U.N.S.C., U.N. 
Doc. S/2003/113 (Jan. 29, 2003) (Meetings with World Bank and European 
Commission); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2001/565 (June 7, 2001) (Meeting with EU 
High Representative CFSP and Meeting with NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander/Europe). 
 138 See Eur. Union, Ofc. in Kosovo / Eur. Union Spec. Rep. in Kosovo, 
Press Rel., Statement by the EU Office in Kosovo/EU Special Representative in Kosovo on the 
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independence, there was a gradual shift from UNMIK representatives 
to local Kosovar representatives taking the lead,139 though they 
continued to operate in parallel throughout the transition.140 Today, 
Kosovo is party to many treaties141 and has partial recognition, though 
it appears that some states might now be reversing direction and 
withdrawing their recognition.142 In late February 2012, Serbia and 
                                               
EULEX renewed mandate (June 17, 2016) available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/press_corner/all_news/news/2016/20
160617_en.htm; Eur. Union, Press Rel., EULEX Kosovo: mandate extended, budget 
approved (June 14, 2016) available at http://avrupa.info.tr/resource-centre/eeas-
news/eeas-single-view/article/eulex-kosovo-mandate-extended-budget-
approved.html. 
 139 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, Kosovo Becomes the International Monetary Fund’s 
186th Member, Press Rel. No. 09/240 (June 29, 2009) available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09240.htm; W. Bank, Kosovo Joins World 
Bank Group Institutions, Press Rel. No. 2009/448/ECA (June 29, 2009) available at 
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22230081∼
pagePK:34370∼piPK:34424∼theSitePK:4607,00.html . 
 140 See U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2013/72, ¶¶ 47–50 (Feb. 4, 2013); U.N.S.C., 
U.N. Doc. S/2012/818, ¶ 40 (Nov. 8, 2012); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2012/275, ¶ 
56–7 (Apr. 27, 2012); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2012/72, ¶ 50 (Jan. 31, 2012); U.N.S.C., 
U.N. Doc. S/2011/675, ¶¶ 51–2 (Oct. 31, 2011); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2011/514, 
¶. 55 (Aug. 12, 2011); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2011/281, ¶ 56 (May 3, 2011); UNSC, 
U.N. Doc. S/2011/43, ¶ 46 (Jan. 28, 2011); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2010/562, ¶ 54 
(Oct. 29, 2010); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2010/401, ¶ 49 (July 29, 2010); U.N.S.C., 
U.N. Doc. S/2010/169, ¶ 37 (Apr. 6, 2010); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2009/497, ¶ 45 
(Sept. 30, 2009); U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2009/149, ¶ 28 (Mar. 17, 2009). 
 141 See Agreement on the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, Sept. 
7, 2012, EU-Kosovo, Law No. 04/L-148, Decree No.DL-039-2012 (Sept. 7, 2012), 
reprinted at No. 25 Off. Gaz. Kosova (Sept. 7, 2012); Agreement concerning 
cooperation in the area of the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, May 23, 2012, T.I.A.S. 12-628; Agreement for economic and technical 
cooperation, Mar. 29, 2012, Kosovo-US, T.I.A.S. 12-329; Agreement on the status 
of armed forces of the United States of America in the territory of the Republic of 
Kosovo, Feb. 18, 2012, Kosovo-US, T.I.A.S. 12-627; Agreement on the protection 
and preservation of certain cultural properties, Dec. 14, 2011, Kosovo-US, T.I.A.S. 
11-1214; Investment incentive agreement, June 30, 2009, Kosovo-US, T.I.A.S. 09-
1005; Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government 
employees, Apr. 3, 17, 2009, Kosovo-US, TIAS. See also Off. Gaz. Rep. Kosovo, 
International Agreements, available at http://gazetazyrtare.rks-gov.net/MN.aspx. 
 142 See AFP, Ghana reverses ‘premature’ recognition of Kosovo, AFP (Nov. 12, 2019) 
available at https://news.yahoo.com/ghana-reverses-premature-recognition-kosovo-
004410324.html?soc_src=community&soc_trk=ma. 
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Kosovo reached an agreement on how Kosovo could operate on the 
international plane.143 The agreement includes provisions for 
participation of Kosovars on behalf of Kosovo in international fora, 
border controls between Serbia and Kosovo on the condition that 
Kosovo cannot use the word “Republic” in its name at international 
meetings.144 In lieu of asserting statehood, the delegation will use a 
nameplate with the word “Kosovo” but with the awkward additional 
of a footnote.145 Kosovo has asserted that “[t]his is a de facto recognition 
of the independence of Kosovo,” and that “[w]e are focusing on the 
                                               
 143 See Eur. Ext. Action, Serbia and Kosovo reach landmark deal, available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eu-facilitated_dialogue_en.htm; 
Aleksandar Vasovic & Matt Robinson, EU wants Serbia accession talks to begin in earnest 
this year, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2015) available at  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/us-serbia-eu-accession-
idUSKBN0MN1V620150327 (“But since a first formal accession conference, none 
of the so-called negotiation chapters have been opened, because of failure to fully 
implement the Serbia-Kosovo deal.”). See also Dan Bilefsky, Serbia and Kosovo Reach 
Agreement on Power-Sharing, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2013) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/world/europe/serbia-and-kosovo-reach-
milestone-deal.html?_r=0; Matthew Brunwasser, Kosovo and Serbia Reach Key Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2012) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/europe/25iht-kosovo25.html. 
Previously Kosovo, as some sort of entity, continued to be represented on the 
international plane by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (“UNMIK”). This 
author has elsewhere reported on the unusual quasi-international status that Serbia 
has agreed for Kosovo, and the negotiations over such a decision. See Worster, Effect 
of Leaked Information, supra note 23, at 482-5 (reporting that US officials discussed 
“possible ways forward on Kosovo” and “discreet brainstorming” towards a 
“realistic, pragmatic, peaceful, win-win solution for Serbs and Albanians” showing a 
less absolutist position on the disputed territory) citing US DEP’T ST, Cable No. 10-
BELGRADE-25, ¶ 15 (Feb. 5, 2010); US DEP’T ST, Cable No. 06-BELGRADE-
1681, ¶ 1 (Oct. 17, 2006); US Sec’y St. John Kerry, Remarks, reprinted at US DEP’T OF 
STATE, OFC. LEGAL ADV.; DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2013) also available at 
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/04/207782.htm. 
 144 See Matthew Brunwasser, Kosovo and Serbia Reach Key Deal, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 24, 2012) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/europe/25iht-kosovo25.html 
(explaining that, in exchange for 
allowing Kosovars to represent themselves in “international forums,” Kosovo’s 
name will not include the word “Republic”). 
 145 See U.N.S.C. Res. 1244. 
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substance, rather than the formalities.”146 However Serbia continues to 
insist that the representatives are not “ambassadors.”147 So, for the 
foreseeable future, states that have recognized Kosovo as a state will 
engage with it as a state, and states that have not will engage with it 
through this unusual Serbian-Kosovar arrangement. 
Palestine is a similar situation. It is controversial, to say the 
least, whether the entity is a state. The language used and intentions 
are often deliberately vague or contradictory, for obvious political 
reasons.148 Notwithstanding this opaque formal status, it is widely 
                                               
 146 See Serbia allocated calling code to Kosovo, B92 (Sept. 9, 2013) available at 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=09&dd=09&nav_i
d=87597. 
 147 See Bojana Barlovac, Kosovo, Serbia Liaison Officers to Start Work, BALKAN 
INSIGHT (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network), (Feb. 13, 2013) available at 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-and-serbia-liaison-officers-
ready-to-start (“Since the agreement to appoint the liaison officers was made, Pristina 
has repeatedly described the officers as “ambassadors”, a term that Belgrade firmly 
rejects, as Serbia does not recognise Kosovo as a state.”); Bojana Barlovac, Serbia 
Denies Kosovo Officers are ‘Ambassadors’, BALKAN INSIGHT (Balkan Investigative 
Reporting Network), (Dec. 12, 2012) available at 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-dismisses-kosovo-officials-
claims-on-ambassadors. 
 148 See G.A. Res. 181 (II), Future government of Palestine (Nov. 29, 1947) (calling 
for the “establishment of an Arab State and a Jewish State in Palestine”); G.A. Res. 
43/177, Question of Palestine (Dec. 15, 1988) (acknowledging “the proclamation of the 
State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988”, 
affirming “the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their sovereignty 
over their territory occupied since 1967”, and deciding that “the designation 
‘Palestine’ should be used in place of the designation ‘Palestine Liberation 
Organization’ in the United Nations system . . . “, but “Recalling its resolution 3237 
(XXIX) of 22 November 1974 on the observer status for the Palestine Liberation 
Organization and subsequent relevant resolutions” and only granting the change in 
designation “without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization within the United Nations system, in conformity with 
relevant United Nations resolutions and practice”); Application of Palestine for 
admission to membership in the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/66/371 – 
S/2011/592 (Sept. 23, 2011) (wherein Abbas refers repeatedly to the already existing 
“State of Palestine” and signs the application in his purported capacity as “President 
of the State of Palestine”); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 10-JERUSALEM-357 (Feb. 26, 
2010) (announcing a Palestinian two-year plan for statehood which strangely comes 
after the declaration of statehood and UN observer upgrade); US DEP’T ST., Cable 
No. 10-JERUSALEM-292 (Feb. 17, 2010) (discussing upcoming Palestinian 
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treated as if it were a state for a number of functional purposes.149 
Palestine has adhered to a wide variety of treaties,150 including one with 
                                               
municipal elections but using expressions like “national” elections, “PA [Palestinian 
Authority] President,” and Palestinian “law,” which could suggest an evolving 
position on Palestinian statehood); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 10-JERUSALEM-148 
(Jan. 25, 2010); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-JERUSALEM-2050 (Nov. 16, 2009) 
(discussing the “mixed messages” about Palestinian statehood being substantive or a 
mere “formality”); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-JERUSALEM-1501 (Aug. 25, 2009); 
Legal Memorandum in Opposition to the Palestinian Authority’s January 2009 
Attempt to Accede to ICC Jurisdiction Over Alleged Acts Committed on Palestinian 
Territory Since 1 July 2001 from Grégor Puppinck et al. to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Court, 12–15 (Eur. Ctr. L. & Justice, Sept. 9, 2009), available 
at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE-45B1-ACC0-
B41706BB41E5/281869/OTPlegalmemorandum1.pdf. 
 149 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-JERUSALEM-1764 (Oct. 2, 2009) 
(observing the Palestinian position that “colonial administrations on the way to 
independence” have been historically treated as if they were states, citing Ceylon and 
Rhodesia); US OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT, INVESTIG. SERV., CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF 
THE LAW, Doc. No. IS-01 155 (Mar. 2001) (entry for “Palestine, Palestine National 
Authority for the West Bank and Gaza” for purposes of documenting “citizenship” 
laws). 
 150 See Agreement on international Railways in the Arab Masreq, Apr. 14, 
2003, __ U.N.T.S __, UN Reg. No. 41357; Agreement on international Roads in the 
Arab Mashreq, May 10, 2001, __ U.N.T.S. __, UN Reg. No. 39639; Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the 
Alimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 
U.N.T.S. 13; UN High Comm’r Hum. Rts, (Rupert Colville, Spokesperson), Press 
briefing notes on Palestine, item 4 (May 2, 2014) available at 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/262AC5B8C25B364585257CCF006C010
D 
“A month ago, on 2 April 2014, the State of Palestine deposited with the Secretary-
General its instruments of accession to a number of international treaties. These 
include seven of the nine core human rights treaties plus one of the substantive 
protocols, as follows: 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(“CEDAW”) 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”) 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (“CERD”) 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (“CAT”) 
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the US151 and one with the EU.152 Most recently Palestine went even 
further and adhered to a long list of international treaties governing the 
basic functions of international relations,153 although some have used 
the personality of the PLO as the vehicle for acting on the international 
plane.154 That being said, in the case of the Oslo accords between the 
PLO and Israel that established limited governance by the Palestine 
Authority in the West Bank, it appears that the parties did intend for 
those instruments to be legally binding.155 Palestine has recently been 
                                               
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) 
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in armed conflict (“CRC-OPAC”)” 
Jodi Rudoren, Palestinians said to seek redress in a World Court, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 
2014) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/01/world/middleeast/palestinians-to-join-
international-criminal-court-defying-israeli-us-warnings.html”. 
 151 See Agreement on Encouragement of Investment, Aug. 11 & Sept. 12, 
1994, U.S. – P.L.O., T.I.A.S.12,564. 
 152 See Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and 
Cooperation, Feb. 24, 1997, Eur. Comm. – P.L.O. (“for the benefit of the Palestinian 
Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip”), art. 33, Off. J. L 187 3-135 (July 
16, 1997). 
 153 See Memorandum of understanding on Maritime transport cooperation 
in the Arab Mashreq, May 9, 2005, __ U.N.T.S. __, U.N. Reg. No. 43044; Agreement 
on international Railways in the Arab Masreq, Apr. 14, 2003, __ U.N.T.S. __, U.N. 
Reg. No. 41357; Agreement on international Roads in the Arab Mashreq, May 10, 
2001, __ U.N.T.S. __, UN Reg. No. 39639; Bilateral Investment Treaty, Apr. 28, 
1998, Egypt – Palestine Auth. reported in U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES: 1959 – 1999 89 (2000), U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2, 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf, also reprinted at U.N. 
Conf. on Trade & Dev., Investment Instruments Online, Bilateral Investment Treaties, BIT 
between Egypt and Occupied Palestinian Territory, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/egypt_plo_arb.pdf [Arabic]; 
GAFTA, adopted by the League of Arab States, Econ. & Soc. Council Res. No. 1317-
O.S.59, Concerning the Declaration on the Establishment of a Pan-Arab Free Trade 
Area (Feb. 19, 1997) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1998). Note that Palestine is regarded 
and treated as a state by the League, represented by the PLO. 
 154 See Agreement on encouragement of investment, Aug. 11 & Sep. 12, 
1994, PLO – US, T.I.A.S. 12564. 
 155 See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
(“Oslo Accords”), Sep. 13, 1993, Isr.-PLO; Legal Conseq. of the Constr. of a Wall 
in the Occup. Palestinian Terr., Adv. Op., 2004 I.C.J. Reps. 231 (July 9); John 
Quigley, The Israel PLO Agreements: Are They Treaties?, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 717, 722 
(1997). At the time of this writing, it appears that Palestine may have withdrawn from 
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on a successful trend of securing recognition,156 although many of 
these recognitions have not been by government branches charged 
with foreign affairs.157 In fact, Palestine has been considered de facto as 
a state by the US as far back as 2001 at least for the purpose of issuing 
laws on nationality.158 Palestine has also joined a number of 
international organizations159 prior to, and following, its recent change 
                                               
the Oslo Accords, see Palestine cancels 1995 Oslo Accords signed with Israel, MIDDLE E. 
MONITOR (Jan. 31, 2020) available at 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200131-palestine-cancels-1995-oslo-
accords-signed-with-israel/. 
 156 See Steven Erlanger, Sweden to Recognize Palestinian State, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
3, 2014) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/04/world/europe/sweden-to-recognize-
palestinian-state.html. See also EU foreign chief calls for a Palestinian state, AL-JAZEERA 
(Nov. 8, 2014), available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/eu-foreign-chief-call. 
 157 See Italian lawmakers urge recognition of Palestinian state, Reuters (Feb. 27, 
2015) available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/02/27/uk-italy-palestinians-vote-
idUKKBN0LV1FW20150227; Sylvie Corbet, French parliament to vote on Palestinian 
state, ASSOC. PRESS (Nov. 12, 2014); Stephen Castle & Jodi Rudoren, A Symbolic Vote 
in Britain Recognizes a Palestinian State, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2014) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/world/europe/british-parliament-
palestinian-state.html?_r=0. 
 158 See e.g. US OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT, INVESTIG. SERV., CITIZENSHIP 
LAWS OF THE LAW, Doc. No. IS-01 155 (Mar. 2001) (entry for “Palestine, Palestine 
National Authority for the West Bank and Gaza” and observing that “Citizenship 
laws are being developed for the region governed by the Palestine National 
Authority. The Oslo Agreement of 1993 empowered the Palestine National 
Authority for the West Bank and Gaza to issue Palestinians passports for this 
region.”) In the same publication, the OPM also treated Taiwan (“ROC”) as a state 
with a nationality. See id. 
 159 See ECOSOC Res. 2089 (LXIII) (July 22, 1977) (admitting Palestine to 
membership in the Eco. & Soc. Comm’n W. Asia (ESCWA)); Pact of the League of 
Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S 237, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.111, Ann. on 
Palestine; but see id. art. 1 (“A League will be formed of the independent Arab States 
which consent to join the League”) (this author’s emphasis); Org. of the Islamic 
Conf., Member States, available at http://www.oic-oci.org/member_states.asp; See 
Arab League Ed. Cult. & Sci. Org., The Member States, available at 
http://www.alecso.org.tn/lng/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1
2&Itemid=13&lang=en;. See also HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NILES M. BLOKKER, 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY § 75 (4th ed. 
2003); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-JERUSALEM-1764 (Oct. 2, 2009); US DEP’T 
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to non-member state observer status at the UN; it has also gained new 
membership in or recognition by certain international organizations.160 
Even prior to the UN observer reclassification, the UN already granted 
Palestine unique enhanced observer participation rights.161 In addition, 
the UN Secretary-General accepted Palestinian “treaties” for 
                                               
ST., Cable No. 09-TELAVIV-2166 (Oct. 1, 2009); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-
JERUSALEM-1607 (Sept. 4, 2009); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 10-JERUSALEM-357 
(Feb. 26, 2010) (reporting on discussions on Palestinian WTO observer status); US 
DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-STATE-99831 (Sept. 25, 2009) (noting that Palestinian 
WTO observer status “raises a number of complex political and legal issues, 
including questions about PA capacity and control over external commercial 
relations.”). 
 160 See Resolution of 17 December 2014 on Recognition of Palestine 
Statehood, EUR. PARL. RES. (2014/2964(RSP)), E.U. Doc. P8_TA(2014)0103 (Dec. 
17, 2014) available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN 
“– having regard to the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council on the Middle 
East Peace Process of 17 November 2014, 
– having regard to the statements of the High Representative/Vice-President on the 
attack in the Har Nof synagogue of 18 November 2014, on the terrorist attack in 
Jerusalem of 5 November 2014, and to the statement by the Spokesperson of the 
EU High Representative on the latest developments in the Middle East of 10 
November 2014, 
– having regard to the announcement of the Swedish government on the recognition 
of the State of Palestine of 30 October 2014, as well as the earlier recognition by 
other Member States before joining the European Union, 
– having regard to the motions on the recognition of the State of Palestine approved 
in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom on 13 October 2014, the Irish 
Senate on 22 October 2014, the Spanish Parliament on 18 November 2014, the 
French National Assembly on 2 December 2014, and the Portuguese Assembly on 
12 December 2014 . . . “ 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Grants Palestinian Membership Status, 
IMEMC (July 3, 2013) available at  
http://www.imemc.org/article/65773. 
 161 See G.A. Res. 3237 (XXIX) (Nov. 22, 1974); G.A. Res. 43/160 (Dec. 9, 
1988); G.A. Res. 43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988) (changing designation as observer from 
“P.L.O.” to “Palestine”); G.A. Res. 52/250 (July 1998) (granting right to participate 
in general debate of the General Assembly, the right of reply, the right to co-sponsor 
resolutions and the right to raise points of order on issues affecting Palestine or the 
Middle East generally; and granting seating in order immediately following non-
member states but before other observers). 
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deposit,162 the ICJ permitted the Palestinians to submit observations in 
the Construction of Wall advisory opinion proceedings,163 and the UN 
Security Council permitted the PLO to participate in discussions 
regarding Palestinian territory,164 all of which are privileges normally 
reserved for states. The European Court of Justice has also 
acknowledged that a treaty between the EU and Palestine had a 
territorial scope, i.e. the Palestinian territories, and normally holding a 
right to territory is a competence reserved for states.165 Even Israel 
treats the Palestinian territory as if it were a state for certain limited 
purposes.166 Perhaps most surprisingly, Israeli nationalist politicians 
even occasionally slip into language of statehood and citizenship when 
discussing Palestine,167 probably for lack of a substitute vocabulary, 
while at the same time denying statehood. 
                                               
 162 See U.N. Charter art. 102 (1) (“Every treaty and every international 
agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter 
comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and 
published by it”) (emphasis added). However, note that treaties between Members 
and non-Members may be deposited and registered and that, on occasion, treaties 
between non-Members have been “filed and recorded”. See Int’l L. Comm’n, 1966-
II YB INT’L L. COMM’N 273. In the case of the Palestinian treaties cited herein, the 
instruments appear to have been deposited, not merely “filed and recorded”. 
 163 See Legal Conseq. of the Constr. of a Wall in the Occup. Palestinian Terr., 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Reps. 231, ¶. 4 (July 9). 
 164 See G.A. Res. 3210 (XXIX); G.A. Res. 3236 (XXIX); G.A. Res. 3237 
(XXIX); G.A. Res. 52/250. 
 165 See, e.g., Case C-386/08, Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, 
Judgment, ¶¶ 44–53 (Eur. Ct. Just., 4th Ch., Feb. 25, 2010) (recognizing that the 
European Communities entered into trade agreements with Israel and the PLO 
separately, and noting that each agreement “has its own territorial scope” with the 
EC[EU]-PLO agreement applying to the West Bank and Gaza Strip). 
 166 See Israel: Prohibition Against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, LIBRARY OF 
CONG. (Mar. 8, 2010), available at  
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205401855_text 
(publicizing an amendment to an Israeli statute that “prohibits bribery of public 
officials of foreign countries, and of international and political entities, including the 
Palestinian Authority”). 
 167 See e.g. Diaa Hadid, Arab Alliance Rises as Force in Israeli Elections, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2015) available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/world/middleeast/ayman-odeh-arab-
alliance-rises-as-force-in-israel-vote.html?_r=0 (quoting and translating Avigdor 
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5. Secession Movements 
Occasionally, secession movements have been acknowledged 
as international legal persons from a functional perspective. For 
example, the US has documented the vigorous insistence by the 
secessionary “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” on being treated 
as if it were a state.168 This demand has been honored by Russia. Russia 
maintains diplomatic contacts with Transdniestria169 through the 
“Russian Special Negotiator for the Transdniestria conflict.”170 Russia 
has even placed units of its armed forces under Transdniestrian 
jurisdiction.171 In addition, the EU has opened a direct dialog with the 
Transdniestria authorities in the larger context of EU expansion. 
Transdniestria has participated in four party diplomatic negotiations 
over the conflict there.172 And official documents issued by the 
Transdniestrian authorities are recognized in Moldova.173 Even the 
ECtHR has recognized that, in line with the submissions of the 
Moldovan government, it had no jurisdiction over events in 
Transdniestria.174 
In the Caucasus, several regions are relevant: Abkhazia, 
Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia. Russia has treated 
the Chechen Republic as a treaty partner for certain limited purposes, 
agreeing to limited autonomy of the region,175 specifically invoking 
                                               
Lieberman, the Israeli Foreign Minister at the time, as declaring Ayman Odeh, the 
Arab Israeli politician, “a Palestinian citizen”). 
 168 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-CHISINAU-425, ¶ 4 (June 3, 2009); US 
DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-KYIV-596, ¶ 7 (Apr. 3, 2009); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 08-
MOSCOW-2653, ¶ 4 (Sept. 4, 2008). 
 169 See Ilaşcu et al v. Mold. & Russ., Appl. No. 48787/99, Judgment (Eur. 
Ct. Hum. Rts., July 8, 2004). 
 170 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 08-MOSCOW-2653, ¶ 2 (Sept. 4, 2008). 
 171 See Ilaşcu et al v. Mold. & Russ., Appl. No. 48787/99, Judgment, ¶ 36 
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., July 8, 2004). 
 172 See id. ¶¶ 98, 162-3. 
 173 See id. ¶ 174. 
 174 See Catan et al. v. Mold. & Russia, Appl. Nos.43370/04 & 18454/06, 
Judgment, ¶ 89 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Gr. Ch., Oct. 19, 2012). 
 175 See Principles for Determining the Bases of Mutual Relations between 
the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic (“Khasavyurt Agreement”), 
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6e94.html; Treaty on Peace and 
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“principles and norms of international law” to govern their relations,176 
and tolerating Chechnyan attempts to conduct limited foreign 
relations.177 Georgia agreed with the Abkhazian authorities to an 
“interim protocol” that provided for a “shared state” but permitting 
each side to retain its own constitution, although it never entered into 
force.178 Georgia takes steps to oppose even the appearance that the 
entities are quasi-states.179 One of the unique aspects of Abkhazia is 
that it has existed, unrecognized, for so long.180 Tuvalu has since 
renounced its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,181 leaving 
only Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru as recognizing states.182 
                                               
the Principles of Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria, May 12, 1997. 
 176 See Edward Walker, No Peace, No War in Caucasus: Secessionist Conflicts in 
Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, HARVARD KENNEDY BELFER CTR. SCI. & 
INT’L AFF. (Feb. 1998), 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3042/no_peace_no_war_in_the_
caucasus.html; Rossiisko-Chechenskii Dogovor o prekrashenii voennykh deistvii, 
reprinted at DIANE CURRAN, FIONA HILL, & ELENA KOSTRITSYNA, THE SEARCH FOR 
PEACE IN CHECHNYA: A SOURCEBOOK 1994-1996 (March 1997); Int’l Crisis Group 
(Nov. 9, 1998) available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6e94.html. 
 177 See Int’l Crisis Group (Nov. 9, 1998) available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6e94.html; Otto Latsis, Dogovor s Chechnei: Kto 
Pobedil, Kto Proigral?, IZVESTIA (May 14, 1997). 
 178 See Int’l Crisis Group (Nov. 9, 1998) available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6e94.html; Elizabeth Fuller, Solution to 
Abkhaz Conflict Continues to Prove Elusive, 1(70) RFE/RL NEWSLINE (July 10, 1997). 
 179 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-TBILISI-1765 (Sept. 25, 2009) (reporting 
on Georgia objection to EU office in Sukhumi due to risk of it being perceived as an 
“embassy”). 
 180 See Wood, Limbo World, supra note 17. 
 181 See Oliver Bullough, This Tiny Pacific Island Nation Just Gave Russia a Big 
Bruise, THE NEW REP. (Apr. 2, 2014) available at 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117238/tuvalu-bruises-russia-establishing-
diplomatic-ties-georgia?a&utm_campaign=tnr-daily-
newsletter&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=12398320. 
 182 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-TBILISI-1765 (Sept. 25, 2009) 
(communicating Georgia’s concern about Venezuela’s recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 08-MANAGUA-1124 (Sept. 4, 2008) 
(reporting that Nicaragua government decided to recognize South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, following Russia intervention in the matter); Chavez recognises Georgia regions: 
Venezuela’s president says he considers Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent, AL-
JAZEERA (Sept. 10, 2009) available at 
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There has been talk of Turkey recognizing Abkhazia de facto.183 Russia 
still actively promotes recognition of the breakaway regions.184 As for 
Nagorno-Karabakh,185 the Armenia Embassy in Russia hosts a 
diplomatic representative from the break-away region, although, the 
Russia position is that this is probably incorrect under the Vienna 
Convention.186 Quasi-statehood has been proposed for the region.187 
Somaliland and Puntland are additional examples.188 These 
entities are largely independent of Somalia and conduct limited 
diplomatic relations, for example, the President of Puntland is 
permitted meetings with the US Ambassador.189 That being said, 
                                               
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2009/09/20099109538889507.html. See 
also Oliver Bullough, This Tiny Pacific Island Nation Just Gave Russia a Big Bruise, THE 
NEW REP. (Apr. 2, 2014) available at 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117238/tuvalu-bruises-russia-establishing-
diplomatic-ties-georgia?a&utm_campaign=tnr-daily-
newsletter&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=12398320. 
 183 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 10-MOSCOW-60 (Jan. 14, 2010) (discussing 
Turkish involvement in Abkhazia and possible support for statehood). 
 184 See Wood, Limbo World, supra note 17; Georgia regions mark ‘independence’: 
Russia calls for international recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, AL-JAZEERA (Aug. 
27, 2009) available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2009/08/200982682034876496.html. 
 185 See S.C. Res. 822; S.C. Res. 853; S.C. Res. 874; S.C. Res. 884; Council of 
Europe Parl. Assembly Res. 1416; Int’l Crisis Group, Report on Nagorno-Karabakh 
(Sept. 14, 2005); Int’l Crisis Group, Report on Nagorno-Karabakh (Oct. 11, 2005); 
Int’l Crisis Group, Report on Nagorno-Karabakh (Nov. 14, 2007). 
 186 See Farid Akberov, Sergei Lavrov comments on representation of Nagorno-
Karabakh separatist regime functioning at Armenian Embassy in Russia, AZERI-PRESS 
AGENCY (Jan. 21, 2014) available at http://en.apa.az/news/205892 (“Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has answered the question whether the operation of 
representation of Nagorno-Karabakh separatist regime at Armenian Embassy in 
Russia is legal or not . . . Lavrov said he is unaware of this issue . . . ‘Views are often 
voiced that the area of embassies are even rented by restaurants in violation of the 
Vienna Convention. I think we should observe the Vienna Convention’”) 
 187 See Int’l Crisis Group (Nov. 9, 1998) available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6e94.html (President Ghukasian opined that 
he could accept “a sort of abridged statehood . . . something similar to a 
confederation” with Azerbaijan.); Agence France Press (Sept. 2, 1997). 
 188 See CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 3, at 412; Pål Kolstø, 
The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States, 43 J. PEACE RES. 723 (2002). 
 189 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-ADDISABABA-648, ¶¶ 1–2 (Mar. 17, 
2009). 
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formal recognition is elusive and the US still continues to only 
recognize the central government of Somalia.190 In distinction from 
Puntland, Somaliland has a history, albeit very limited, of previously 
being widely recognized as an independent state prior to unification 
into Somalia.191 Today it maintains a quasi-embassy in Addis Ababa192 
that issues visas to would-be travelers.193 These visas are recognized by 
some neighboring African states.194 Yet it cannot receive foreign aid 
due to lack of recognition.195 Looking to the future, the President of 
Puntland has lobbied against international recognition of 
Somaliland,196 and in favor of creating a federal state structure within 
Somalia.197 
Lastly, during the pre-independence preparations by South 
Sudan, ambassadors and diplomats were already meeting with 
individuals from the embryonic “Government of South Sudan,” even 
though the referendum on independence had not been completed and 
the new country had not been declared. What appeared to be critical 
in agreeing to these, perhaps premature, meetings, was the view of the 
US Department of State that the outcome of the referendum was 
“inevitable.”198 The concern of the State Department was not whether 
                                               
 190 See United States recognizes the government of Somalia for the first time since 1991, 
reprinted at US DEP’T OF STATE, OFC. LEGAL ADV., DIGEST OF UNITED STATES 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2013), available at 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/01/202997.htm; 
www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2013/01/202998.htm.; 
www.state.gov/s/l/c8183.htm. 
 191 See Nora Y. S. Ali, For Better or For Worse? The Forced Marriage of Sovereignty 
and Self-Determination, 47 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 417 (2014). 
 192 See Wood, Limbo World, supra note 17. 
 193 See id. 
 194 See id. 
 195 See Nora YS Ali, For Better or For Worse? The Forced Marriage of Sovereignty 
and Self-Determination, 47 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 417 (2014). 
 196 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-ADDISABABA-648, ¶¶ 1, 7 (Mar. 17, 
2009). 
 197 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-ADDISABABA-648, ¶ 1 (Mar. 17, 2009). 
 198 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 10-USUNNEWYORK-109, ¶ 1 (Feb. 25, 
2010). 
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legal criteria had been met but whether the new state was in fact 
functionally operating as a state.199 
6. Competing Governments 
While this article has largely avoided questions of entities that 
did not wish to be independent states, the next category of status 
implicates that problem. Generally, entities that do not wish to be 
states are not considered states.200 Instead, these distinct territorial 
entities might be considered rival governments to territory. However, 
as a pragmatic way to manage the two competing governments, where 
both hold some of the territory under dispute, at least one of the two 
                                               
 199 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 10-USUNNEWYORK-109, ¶¶ 3–4 (Feb. 
25, 2010). 
 200 See CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 3, at 206–21 
(discussing the legal status of Taiwan under international law and concluding that 
Taiwan is “not a State because it has not unequivocally asserted its separation from 
China and is not recognized as a State distinct from China”). This conclusion is rather 
absolute, however, and overlooks the likelihood that Taiwan, like Palestine, used 
purposefully vague language regarding its intent in light of the very real risk that the 
People’s Republic of China would impose sanctions against it. See Case No. 
5A_329/2009, (Bundesgericht [BGer] [Fed. Sup. Ct.], Switz., Sept. 9, 2010) 
(evidencing that Taiwan regards itself as a state for the purposes of inclusion in the 
International Organization for Standardization country name list). See also 
CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 3, at 216–18 (discussing Taiwan’s 
ambiguous statements in 1999 regarding a unitary China as signifying Taiwan’s 
hesitance to speak plainly regarding its desire for formal separation in light of 
threatened sanctions). See also Brad R. Roth, The Entity That Dare Not Speak Its Name: 
Unrecognized Taiwan as a Right-Bearer in the International Legal Order, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 
91 (2009); Daniel P O’Connell, The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem, 
50 AM. J. INT’L L. 405, 415; Thomas D. Grant, Taiwan’s Status in International Law, in 
UNLOCKING THE SECRET OF TAIWAN’S SOVEREIGNTY 75, 96-98 (Chia-lung Lin et 
al. eds, 2008) (suggesting that the declaration may implicitly advert to the UN 
Charter’s prohibition of threats and uses of force “in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations”); Cameron M. Otopalik, Taiwan’s Quest for 
Independence: Progress on the Margins for Recognition of Statehood, 14 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 82 
(2006) (discussing the creeping status of an independent state). For a more 
conventional approach, tying the legality of the use of force to the sovereignty 
question, see Phil C.W. Chan, The Legal Status of Taiwan and the Legality of the Use of Force 
in a Cross-Taiwan Strait Conflict, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 455, 482–91 (2009). 
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entities might be treated as if it were a state, even though it might not 
wish to be one. 
Taiwan is the obvious example. The origins of the PR 
China/ROC standstill begin when the ROC was established in 1912, 
overturning the imperial system. Fighting erupted between the ROC 
and the rival Chinese Communist Party until 1949 when the 
Communist Party drove the ROC Government to Taiwan Island and 
proclaimed the PR China. Some states immediately recognized the new 
government as the government of all of China,201 but others waited 
until the ROC was expelled from the UN in 1971 and the PR China 
accredited instead as the representatives of China.202 Today the PR 
China considers Taiwan Island part of China and the ROC a 
secessionary movement.203 
While the usual articulation of the ROC position is that it is (or 
continues to be) the government of China, the real position is almost 
incoherent204 and likely deliberately constructed as such to mask reality. 
The President of the ROC has referred to the ROC-PR China 
relationship as a “special relation,” not a relationship between two 
                                               
 201 See USSR (Oct 2, 1949); Bulgaria, Romania (Oct. 3, 1949); Poland, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia (Oct. 4, 1949); Yugoslavia (Oct. 5, 1949); Albania (Nov. 
23, 1949); East Germany, Mongolia, North Korea; Burma (Dec. 9, 1949); India (Dec. 
30, 1949); Pakistan (Jan. 4, 1950); United Kingdom, Ceylon, Norway, Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Israel (Jan. 6, 1950); Afghanistan (Jan. 13, 1950). 
 202 See G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI) Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s 
Republic of China in the United Nations (Oct. 25, 1971). 
 203 See Taiwan Aff’rs Off. of the St. Council of the PRC, Anti-Secession Law 
adopted by NPC, available at 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/OneChinaPrinciple/201103/t20110317_17
90121.htm. 
 204 See Mainland Aff’rs Council, Exec. Yuan (Cabinet), Rep. of China 
[Taiwan], Explanation of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (July 5, 1994); Congr. 
Research Serv. (Shirley A. Kan), Report for Congress, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 
‘One China’ Policy – Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, No. RL303341, at 
37 (Dec. 16, 2002) available at  
www.csis.org/isp/taiwan/tw_uct_crs.pdf. Recently Kenya has extradited two 
Taiwanese citizens to mainland China for prosecution and there has been apparently 
no discussion over whether Taiwan is actually part of the PRChina, with most 
authorities treating Taiwan as a separate country. See Dan Levin, China to Prosecute 
Taiwanese in Fraud Case Despite Acquittals in Kenya, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016). 
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nations.205 Alternatively, but no less vaguely, referred to as “cross-
straits” relations within one China.206 There are also some efforts to 
recharacterize the entire legal regime between the PR China and ROC 
as neither international nor domestic, but distinctly “Chinese”.207 In 
this approach, we might be reminded us of the now discarded idea of 
“imperial” law between UK and India, as a lex specialis legal regime 
distinct from international law. This careful positioning of PR China 
and ROC has not foreclosed the ROC’s sometimes articulated view 
that it could be either the lawful government of one China or a state 
independent from the PR China confined to Taiwan Island. Surely the 
ROC has some form of personality in that it can conclude contracts.208 
                                               
 205 See e.g. Taiwan and China in ‘special relations’: Ma, THE CHINA POST (Sept. 
4, 2008) available at 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-
taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm. When asked to 
comment on the idea of “two Chinas” during the interview, Ma said that the PRC’s 
constitution does not allow the existence of another country in its territory, and 
neither does the ROC’s. “Therefore, we (Taiwan and China) have a special 
relationship, but not that between two countries”. This language sounds similar to 
the Great Britain-Irish relation of not being foreign, and the view of Alex Salmond 
during the Scottish independence debate that Scotland would not be foreign to 
England. 
 206 See US DEP’T St., Cable 10-AI TAIPEI-157 (Feb. 10, 2010) (examining 
Taiwan-P.R. China cross-straits trade discussions for similar occasional terminology, 
suggesting a less than absolute position on Taiwan); Dimitri Bruyas, Ma repeats ‘mutual 
non-denial’ policy, THE CHINA POST (Mar. 24, 2008) available at 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/presidential%20election/2008/03
/24/148519/Ma-seeks.htm. 
 207 See Shirley A. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy – Key 
Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., at 59 (Oct. 
10, 2014). 
 208 See Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301–16 (2006); Michael 
Martina, J.R. Wu, Ben Blanchard & Clarence Fernandez, China angered after U.S. fighter 
jets land in Taiwan, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2015) available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/02/us-china-usa-taiwan-
idUSKBN0MT0SA20150402; Kerry Dumbaugh, Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Recent 
Developments and Their Policy Implications, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV. (Nov. 2, 2009) 
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112057.pdf; Shirley A. 
Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV. (Aug. 29, 
2014) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf; Lowell 
Dittmer, The Evolution of China’s Policy Towards Taiwan, in CHINA DIVIDE: EVOLVING 
RELATIONS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND MAINLAND CHINA 33, 40–1 (J.W. Wheeler ed., 
1996). 
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In fact, following the 1992 Consensus, and despite that fact that it 
appears to still support the 1992 Consensus,209 the ROC continues to 
assert its “sovereignty”210 (distinct from right to exercise “authority”211) 
and expresses interest in UN membership.212 Yet at the same time, 
                                               
 209 See Lee Teng-hui, U.S. Can’t Ignore Taiwan, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 1998) 
(“The path to a democratic China must begin with a recognition of the present reality 
by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. And that reality is that China is divided, just as 
Germany and Vietnam were in the past and as Korea is today. Hence, there is no 
“one China” now.”) But see Taiwan opposition candidate calls for return to one China formula, 
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2019), https://news.yahoo.com/taiwan-opposition-candidate-
calls-return-141215263.html?soc_src=community&soc_trk=ma (“Tsai [President 
Tsai Ing-wen] refuses to recognise an agreement reached between China’s 
Communists and Taiwan’s former ruling Kuomintang (KMT) that both sides belong 
to ‘one China’, with each having their own interpretation of what that means. KMT 
presidential candidate Han [Han Kuo-yu] said the consensus reached in 1992 had 
been the ‘magical’ tool to stability and communications across the Taiwan Strait. 
‘With the ‘92 consensus’, many cross-strait issues could be resolved,’ Han told 
reporters in Taipei, vowing to restart dialogue with China if elected president.”). 
 210 See MAINLAND AFF’RS COUNCIL, President Ma’s New Year’s Day Celebratory 
Message (Jan. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=50076&ctNode=5909&mp=3 (“we must 
also preserve the sovereignty and dignity of the Republic of China on Taiwan.”); 
Richard Halloran, Taiwan’s Ma Addresses Economy, Sovereignty, THE HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER (Dec. 7, 2008), available at 
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2008/Dec/07/op/hawaii812070305.ht
ml (“ROC is a sovereign country”); MAINLAND AFF’RS COUNCIL, The Government’s 
Position Paper on Ma Ying-jeou’s Stance about ‘Taiwan’s Pledge of Not Seeking Independence in 
Exchange for China’s Commitment of Not Using Force against Taiwan’ (Nov. 3, 2006) 
available at 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=50718&ctNode=5913&mp=3; MAINLAND 
AFF’RS COUNCIL, Exec. Yuan (Cabinet), Rep. of China [Taiwan], Taipei Speaks Up: 
Special State-to-State Relationship, Republic of China’s Policy Documents (Chairman Su Chi 
at July 12, 1999 Press Conference) (Aug. 1999). 
 211 See Pres. Ma Ying-jeou, Remarks at the 2011 ILA Asia-Pacific Regional 
Conference 6–7 (May 30, 2011) available at 
http://www.cils.nccu.edu.tw/Opening%20Address%20of%20President%20Ma%2
0Ying-jeou.pdf. 
 212 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-STATE-105599 (Oct. 9, 2009) (not 
supporting ROC membership in international organizations); Congr. Research Serv. 
(Shirley A. Kan), Report for Congress, Security Implications of Taiwan’s Presidential 
Election of March 2008, No. RL104279, at 37 (2008) available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/104279.pdf; US DEP’T ST., Cable 
No. 08-AITTAIPEI-1762 (Dec. 22, 2008) (discussing plans of ROC to attend WHO 
World Health Assembly); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 08-AITTAIPEI-1387 (Sept. 22, 
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paradoxically, the ROC denies an interest in independence from China 
in carefully nuanced statements.213 Occasionally, officials have slipped 
into statehood language,214 perhaps again for lack of an alternate 
                                               
2008) (reporting on news reports on UN support of ROC membership in UN 
agencies); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 08-STATE-95091 (Sept. 5, 2008) (affirming that 
the US will support ROC membership in international organizations where 
“statehood” is not a criteria of membership, although the US supports “flexible 
arrangements” that permit the people on the island to engage the international 
community); MAINLAND AFF’RS COUNCIL, Position Paper Regarding the Referendum on 
Joining the United Nations under the Name of Taiwan (Sept. 7, 2007) available at 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/9111015321771.pdf; US DEP’T ST., Cable 
No. 07-TOKYO-3360 (July 23, 2007); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 07-AITTAIPEI-
1381 (June 18, 2007); Reps. Steve Chabot, Shelley Berkley & Dana Rohrabacher, 
Don’t Abandon Taiwan, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2007); Shirley A. Kan, China/Taiwan: 
Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy – Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, 
CONGR. RESEARCH SERV. at 36 (Oct. 10, 2014) available at 
www.csis.org/isp/taiwan/tw_uct_crs.pdf. 
 213 See Sigrid Winkler, Biding Time: The Challenge of Taiwan’s International Status, 
Brookings Inst. Paper (Nov. 2011) available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/11/17-taiwan-international-
status-winkler (“Lee Teng-hui’s government introduced the idea of “flexible” or 
“pragmatic diplomacy” which stipulated that, first, if formal relations with other 
countries were not possible, then Taiwan should make an effort to entertain 
substantial relations—meaning close relations without diplomatic recognition. 
Second, Taiwan should attempt to participate in international organizations while 
being flexible on name and membership status issues.”); Keith Bradsher, Taiwan 
Takes Step Forward at U.N. Health Agency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2009) (quoting ROC 
President Ma: “We’re not asking for recognition; we only want room to breathe.”). 
 214 See Tsungting Chung, Regional organizations, individuals, and the mediation in 
Beijing-Taipei disputes after the cold war, in CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, SECURITY AND 
INTERVENTION IN EAST ASIA 249 (Jacob Bercovitch, et al eds., 2008) (documenting 
that statement by Lee Teng-Hui in 1999 that the special relationship between 
sovereign states or a state to state relationship); CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, 
supra note 3, at 151; SEAN D. MURPHY, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1999-2001 134 (2002) (observing the announcement that 
ROC-PR China relations would be treated as “state-to-state relations”); JOHN W. 
GARVER, FACE OFF: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND TAIWAN’S 
DEMOCRATIZATION 29 (1997) (Taiwan is “an independent sovereign state”); Alan 
M. Wachman, The State-to-State Flap: Tentative Conclusions about Risk and Restraint in 
Diplomacy Across the Taiwan Straits, 4 HARV. ASIA Q. (2000). 
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vocabulary to describe reality.215 The conclusion must be that its 
precise personality and nature is deliberately kept obscure.216 
Because of this situation, the international community takes a 
functional approach to international legal rights and duties for the 
ROC.217 Some states never stopped regarding it as a state,218 and others 
did, though they may still often treat it as if it were a state.219 Some 
                                               
 215 See e.g. Nationality Act (Jan. 27, 2006), art. 9 (ROC, Taiwan), translation 
available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx. This law is currently in the 
process of being amended to provide for limited possibilities of dual nationality, see 
Nationality Amendments Pass First Legislative Review, TAIWAN TODAY (Dec. 18, 2014). 
See also Joe McDonald, China rebukes Zara, Delta for calling Taiwan ‘Country’, ASSOC. 
PRESS (Jan. 12, 2018) available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2018/China-
rebukes-Zara-Delta-and-Medtronic-for-calling-Taiwan-a-country-on-their-websites-
in-a-new-show-of-sensitivity-about-the-self-ruled-island/id-
2075494b47674e1e9c35c2dc4c8518bd (accusing certain corporations of listing 
Taiwan as if were a country, to which Delta replied “We apologize for hurting the 
feelings of the Chinese people!” and another company argued that it was only trying 
to help its customers by engaging in common usage). 
 216 See CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 3, at 219 (no clear 
statement of independence). Brad R. Roth, The Entity that Dare not Speak its Name: 
Unrecognized Taiwan as a Right-Bearer in the International Legal Order, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 
91, 100 (2009). However, sometimes true independence is distinguished from 
“formal” independence, see Tsungting Chung, Regional organizations, individuals, and the 
mediation in Beijing-Taipei disputes after the cold war, in CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, 
SECURITY AND INTERVENTION IN EAST ASIA 251 (Jacob Bercovitch, et al eds., 
2008). 
 217 See US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-TAIPEI-1420 (Dec. 3, 2009) (discussing 
Taiwan participation in fisheries organizations from a functional point of view, 
without comment on sovereignty); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-STATE-105599 
(Oct. 9, 2009) (one china policy, yet “unofficial”, de facto diplomatic relations with 
ROC); Phil C.W. Chan, The Legal Status of Taiwan and the Legality of the Use of Force in a 
Cross-Taiwan Strait Conflict, 8 CHIN. J. INT’L L. 455 (1990); Edward Cody, Taiwan 
Announces First National Security Policy / Plan Calls on China to Help Create Buffer Zone in 
the Strait, WASH. POST (May 21, 2006) available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Taiwan-announces-first-national-security-
policy-2496527.php. 
 218 See DEON GELDENHUYS, ISOLATED STATES: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 148 (1990). 
 219 See A Bill to Direct the Secretary of State to Develop a Strategy to Obtain 
Observer Status for Taiwan in the International Criminal Police Organization, and 
for Other Purposes, S. 2426, Publ. L. 114-139 (Mar. 18, 2016); An Act to direct the 
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states, while in principle agreeing to the one-China policy, do not 
always respect it in application.220 This practice includes finding that 
                                               
Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the 
triennial International Civil Aviation Organization’s Assembly, 127 Stat. 480, Publ. 
L. 113-17 (July 12, 2013) (in both cases, whether they could treat Taiwan as if it were 
a state for purposes of eligibility to participate as an observer, was never discussed); 
Eur. Parl., European Parliament resolution of 11 May 2011 on the annual report from the 
Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) in 2009, presented to the European Parliament in application of Part 
II, Section G, paragraph 43 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006, EU Doc. 
2010/2124(INI)), P7_TA-PROV(2011)-227, art. 79 (May 11, 2011); US DEP’T ST., 
Cable No. 10-TAIPEI-1205 (Feb. 26, 2010) (referring to the Taipower corporation 
in Taiwan as “state-owned”); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 10-AITTAIPEI-40 (Jan. 11, 
2010) (arms sales to ROC); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 09-AITTAIPEI-457 (Apr. 15, 
2009) (noting the “dozens of cooperative agreements and other arrangements” with 
the ROC . . . cover[ing] a broad range of environmental, health, scientific, and 
technical fields, including civil nuclear cooperation, consumer product and food 
safety, environmental protection, public health, labor affairs, biomedical sciences, 
seismology and earthquake monitoring, and nanoscience and nanotechnology.”); US 
DEP’T ST., Cable No. 08-TAIPEI-1728 (Dec. 15, 2008) (reporting that the executive 
would seek to ratify International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”), despite not being a member of the UN); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 06-
AITTAIPEI-546 (Feb. 22, 2006) (requiring the US to pressure organizations to hold 
meetings where the hosts are not pressured by China to exclude the ROC); JEFFREY 
L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESSES 138, 153–5 (3d ed. 2010); Milena Sterio, A Grotian 
Moment: Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 209; 
Rachel Chan, Taiwan thanks US Senate for backing ICAO bid, TAIWAN TODAY (Sept. 
23, 2011) available at http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=176714&CtNode=436; 
ROC Min. For. Aff’rs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) Becomes 
the 37th Country to Be Included in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (Oct. 4, 2012) available at 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/ArticleDetail/DetailDefault/8a11921e-a419-
4bc8-8e85-489276b417bc?arfid=7b3b4d7a-8ee7-43a9-97f8-7f3d313ad781; William 
Lowther, US, PRC discussing ways for Taiwan to join world bodies, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 9, 
2010) available at 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/print/2010/12/09/2003490463; Pasha 
L. Hsieh, An Unrecognized State in Foreign and International Courts: The Case of the Republic 
of China on Taiwan, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 765 (2007). 
 220 See Phils v. China, Case No. 2013-19, Award on Juris. & Admiss, ¶ 22 
(Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII UNCLOS, Oct. 29, 2015) (“In addition, the 
Philippines has deliberately excluded from the category of the maritime features 
‘occupied or controlled by China’ the largest island in the Nansha Islands, Taiping 
Dao, which is currently controlled by the Taiwan authorities of China. This is a grave 
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treaties with the ROC, when it was the recognized government of all 
of China, are still valid, though now only binding Taiwan Island.221 In 
                                               
violation of the One-China Principle and an infringement of China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. This further shows that the second category of claims brought by 
the Philippines essentially pertains to the territorial sovereignty dispute between the 
two countries.”). 
 221 See Agreement on Trade Matters, Dec. 29, 1978, US-ROC, 30 U.S.T. 
6439, T.I.A.S. 9561, 1179 U.N.T.S. 313; International Express Mail Agreement, Sep. 
11, Nov. 10, 1978, US-ROC, 30 U.S.T. 3277, T.I.A.S. 9392, 1179 U.N.T.S. 291; 
Memorandum of Agreement Relating to the Provision of Flight Inspection Services, 
Aug. 21, Oct. 1, 1978, US-ROC, 30 U.S.T. 273, T.I.A.S. 9197, 1150 U.N.T.S. 271; 
Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Relating to Trade of Non-rubber 
Footwear June 14, 1977, US-ROC; Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement 
Amending the Agreement of 14 June 1977 Relating to Trade of Non-rubber 
Footwear, Aug. 4-5, 1977, US-ROC, 1118 U.N.T.S.; Agreement Relating to Trade in 
Textiles, Apr. 11, 1974, US-ROC, 25 U.S.T. 720, T.I.A.S. 7821; Agreement for 
Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Apr. 4, 1972, US-ROC, 23 
U.S.T. 945, T.I.A.S. 7364, amended Mar. 15, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 913, T.I.A.S. 7834; 
Agreement on Technological Advancement in Connection with Water Resources, 
Land Utilization and Various Fields of Irrigated Agriculture, May 12, 1972, US-ROC, 
23 U.S.T. 1135, T.IA.S. 7374; Agreement on the Status of United States Armed 
Forces in the Republic of China, Aug. 31, 1965, US-ROC, 572 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Agreement for Financing Certain Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, 
Apr. 23, 1964, US-ROC, 15 U.S.T. 408, T.I.A.S. 5572; 524 U.N.T.S. 141; Agricultural 
Commodities Agreement, with Exchange of Notes, Aug. 31, 1962, US-ROC, 13 
U.S.T. 1930, T.I.A.S. 5151, 460 U.N.T.S. 247, amended Jan. 15, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 131, 
T.I.A.S. 5282, 473 U.N.T.S. 380, amended June 3, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 667, T.I.A.S. 5588, 
526 U.N.T.S. 330; Agreement regarding the ownership and use of local currency 
repayments made by China to the Development Loan Fund, Dec. 24, 1958, US-
ROC, 10 U.S.T. 16, T.I.A.S. 4162, 340 U.N.T.S. 251; Agreement for exchange of 
insured parcel post and regulations of execution, July 30, Aug. 19, 1957, US-ROC, 8 
U.S.T. 2031, T.I.A.S. 3941, 300 U.N.T.S. 61; Agreement prescribing nonimmigrant 
visa fees and validity of nonimmigrant visas, Dec. 20, 1955, Feb. 20, 1965, US-ROC, 
7 U.S.T. 585, T.I.A.S. 3539, 275 U.N.T.S. 73, amended July 11, Oct. 17 & Dec. 7, 1956, 
18 U.S.T. 3167; T.I.A.S. 6410, 697 U.N.T.S. 256, amended May 8, June 9 & 15, 1970, 
21 U.S.T. 2213, T.I.A.S. 6972, 776 U.N.T.S. 344; Exchange of notes constituting an 
agreement relating to the establishment of a United States Navy medical research 
Center at Taipei, Taiwan, Mar. 30, Apr. 26, Oct. 14, 1955, US-ROC, 268 U.N.T.S. 
165; Exchange of notes constituting an agreement extending the above-mentioned 
agreement, as amended, October 14, 1975, US-ROC, 1113 U.N.T.S. ___ U.N. Reg. 
No 3857; Agreement relating to the loan of small naval craft to China, May 14, 1954, 
US-ROC, 5 U.S.T. 892, T.I.A.S. 2979, 231 U.N.T.S. 165 amended Mar. 22 and 31, 
1955, 6 U.S.T. 750, T.I.A.S. 3215, 251 U.N.T.S. 399, amended June 18, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 
2973, T.I.A.S. 3346, 265 U.N.T.S. 406, amended May 16, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 787, T.I.A.S. 
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one approach to avoiding the question of claims to governance, the 
ROC government is sometimes referred to simply as “Taipei”,222 
including in some treaties and Memoranda of Understanding with 
Taiwan.223 Strangely even the PR China entered into a treaty with the 
ROC, although formally the agreement was adopted between the 
(Taiwan) Straits Exchange Foundation and the (PRC) Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, and later “approved” by the 
respective legislatures and executives.224 In addition, Taiwan has 
                                               
3837, 284 U.N.T.S. 380, amended Oct. 12, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2233, T.I.A.S. 4597, 393 
U.N.T.S. 320, amended Aug. 15, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 1924, T.I.A.S. 5150, 460 U.N.T.S. 
237, amended Feb. 23, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 126, T.I.A.S. 5771, 542 U.N.T.S. 361, amended 
Dec. 16, 1970 - Jan. 14, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 12, T.I.A.S. 7037, 776 U.N.T.S. 334; 
Agreement relating to guaranties for projects in Taiwan proposed by nationals of the 
United States, June 25, 1952, US-ROC, 3 U.S.T. 4846, T.I.A.S. 2657, 136 U.N.T.S. 
229, amended December 30, 1963 (14 U.S.T. 2222, T.I.A.S. 5509, 505 U.N.T.S. 308; 
Agreement relating to duty-free entry of relief goods and relief packages and to the 
defrayment of transportation charges on such shipments, Nov. 5, 18, 1948, US-ROC, 
3 U.S.T. 5462, T.I.A.S. 2749, 198 U.N.T.S. 287, amended Oct. 20 & Dec. 12, 1952, 3 
U.S.T. 5462, T.I.A.S. 2749, 198 U.N.T.S. 294, amended July 12 & Oct. 26, 1954, 5 
U.S.T. 2930, T.I.A.S. 3151, 237 U.N.T.S. 337; Arrangement for the direct exchange 
of certain information regarding the traffic in narcotic drugs, Mar. 12, June 21, July 
28, Aug.30, 1947, US-ROC, 6 Bevans 797; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, And 
Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, US-ROC, 63 Stat. 1299; T.I.A.S. 1871; 6 Bevans 761; 25 
U.N.T.S. 69; Agreement under section 3 (c) of the Lend-Lease Act, June 28, 1946, 
US-ROC, 61 Stat. 3895; T.I.A.S. 1746; 6 Bevans 758; 34 U.N.T.S. 121; Agreement 
on the disposition of lend-lease supplies in inventory or procurement in the United 
States, June 14, 1946, US-ROC, 60 Stat. 1760; T.I.A.S. 1533; 6 Bevans 753; 4 
U.N.T.S. 253; Preliminary agreement regarding principles applying to mutual aid in 
the prosecution of the war against aggression, June 24, 1942, US-ROC, 56 Stat. 1494; 
EAS 251; 6 Bevans 735; 14 U.N.T.S. 343; Treaty of arbitration, June 27, 1930, US-
ROC, 47 Stat. 2213; T.S. 857; 6 Bevans 724; 140 L.N.T.S. 183; Parcel post 
convention, May 29, 1916, US-ROC, 39 Stat. 1665; Treaty looking to the 
advancement of the cause of general peace, Sep. 15, 1914, US-ROC, 39 Stat. 1642; 
T.S. 619 & 619-A; 6 Bevans 711; N.Y. Chinese TV Programs Inc. v. U.E. Enter., 954 
F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir. 1992); Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank, 104 F. Supp. 59 
(N.D. Cal. 1952). 
 222 See Keith Bradsher, Taiwan Takes Step Forward at U.N. Health Agency, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2009) (documenting that ROC agreed with the PRC to use the name 
“Chinese Taipei” at the WHO). 
 223 See generally ROC (Taiwan) Treaty Database, available at 
http://no06.mofa.gov.tw/mofatreatys/IndexE.aspx. 
 224 See Mo Yan-chih, Cross-strait service trade pact signed, TAIPEI TIMES (June 22, 
2013) available at 
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entered into diplomatic relations as if it were a state.225 Here, there is 
often the necessity of using unusual legal vehicles: the American 
Institute in Taiwan administers treaties and otherwise handles foreign 
affairs with the US,226 and representatives to the Taipei Government 
are sometimes characterized as “on leave” from their respective 
foreign services though they retain privileges and immunities in 
Taiwan.227 Yet everyone is plainly aware of the underlying substance of 
the arrangement, despite its formal structure. Taiwan has even joined 
many international organizations,228 yet officially continuing to 
                                               
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/06/22/2003565371; 
Chris Hogg, Taiwan and China sign landmark trade agreement, BBC NEWS (June 29, 2010) 
available at http://www.bbc.com/news/10442557. 
 225 See ROC, Min. For. Aff’rs, available at 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=32618&CtNode=1865&mp=6; 
ROC, Gov’t Info. Ofc, Embassies, Consulates and Missions Abroad, available at 
http://www.taiwanembassy.org/dept.asp?mp=1&codemeta=locationIDE; Edward 
I-hsin Chen, The Role of the United States in cross-strait negotiations: A Taiwanese perspective, 
in CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, SECURITY AND INTERVENTION IN EAST ASIA 200 
(Jacob Bercovitch, et al eds., 2008); Lowell Dittmer, The Evolution of China’s Policy 
Towards Taiwan, in CHINA DIVIDE: EVOLVING RELATIONS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND 
MAINLAND CHINA 33 (J.W. Wheeler ed., 1996). 
 226 See Taiwan Relations Act, Publ. L. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, 22 U.S.C. 3305, § 6; 
Exec. Order 12143, 44 Fed. Reg. 37191; Congr. Research Serv. (Shirley A. Kan), 
Report for Congress, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, No. RL30957 (2010) 
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf; Kerry Dumbaugh, 
Taiwan’s Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing Implications, CONGR. 
RESEARCH SERV. at 3 (Nov. 3, 2009) available at 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/4334.pdf. 
 227 See Cheri Attix, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Are Taiwan’s Trading 
Partners Implying Recognition of Taiwanese Statehood?, 25 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 357, 364 
(1995). 
 228 See ROC, Min. For. Aff’rs, available at 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=51335&CtNode=2254&mp=6. 
Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization, 1968, Agency for International Trade 
Information and Cooperation, May 21, 2009, Asian Development Bank, Aug. 22, 
1966 (under name “Taipei, China.”), Asian Productivity Organization, May 11, 1961, 
Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center, May 22, 1971, Asian/Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering, Feb. 1997, Asia-Pacific Association of Agricultural 
Research Institutions, Apr. 7, 1999, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Nov. 1991, 
Asia-Pacific Legal Metrology Forum, Nov. 1994, Association for Science 
Cooperation in Asia, 1994, Association of Asian Election Authorities, Feb. 1998, 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Nov. 10, 1992, Egmont Group 
of Financial Intelligence Units Egmont Group, July 1998, Extended Commission for 
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maintain is nuanced position on statehood.229 For example, the ROC 
government has been recognized as quasi-independent for purposes of 
international civil aviation, again a functionalist approach.230 Other 
states play the same game: affirming their right to maintain some 
unofficial relations with the island government, yet continue to 
recognize the “One China” policy.231 The best conclusion is that, from 
                                               
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 2002, Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission, 2010, International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like 
Species in the North Pacific Ocean, Jan. 30, 2002, International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors, 1994, International Competition Network, Oct. 2001, 
International Cotton Advisory Committee, 1963, International Council for 
Information Technology in Government Administration, 2010, International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, 1987, International Satellite System for 
Search and Rescue Cospas-Sarsat, June 4, 1992, International Seed Testing 
Association, 1962, Office International des Epizooties, Oct. 1, 1954, South-East Asia 
Central Banks, Jan. 24, 1992, South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization, Sept. 23, 2012, Study Group on Asian Tax Administration and 
Research, Feb. 1996, Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, June 19, 
2004; World Customs Organization (Technical Committee on Customs Valuation), 
Jan. 2002, World Customs Organization (Technical Committee on Rules of Origin), 
Jan. 2002, World Trade Organization, Jan. 1, 2002 (although as separate customs 
territory). 
 229 See US Dep’t St., Cable No. 08-STATE-95091 (Sept. 5, 2008) (affirming 
the US government officials posted to the “American Institute in Taiwan” are not 
diplomats, but consultants, and diplomatic passports may not be used, and arranging 
meetings between US and ROC officials to take place outside US or ROC offices to 
avoid appearance of diplomacy); US DEP’T ST., Cable No. 07-AITTAIPEI-1718 
(Aug. 1, 2007) (reporting on claims for “Taiwan’s already independent status” and 
that “it is ‘inappropriate to acknowledge’ that Taiwan is an independent sovereign 
state”); Peter Ritter, Taiwan’s Leader Keeps Low Profile Abroad, TIME (Aug. 11, 2008) 
available at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1831382,00.html 
(“Ma will try to avoid antagonizing Beijing by slipping through the U.S. as quietly as 
possible, changing planes on the west coast and not attending public events. ‘We are 
keeping this simple and low-key,’ says Henry Chen, a spokesman for Taiwan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.’”); Pasha L. Hsieh, An Unrecognized State in Foreign and 
International Courts: The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 765 
(2007). 
 230 See Stefan Talmon, The Recognition of the Chinese Government and the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 8 CHIN. J. INT’L L. 135 (2009). 
 231 See US INFO. SERV., Joint Communique of the United States of America 
and the People’s Republic of China (1979), available at 
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique02.htm; Joint Communiqué of the 
United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (1972) (“Shanghai 
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a functional perspective, the ROC is a de facto independent legal 
person232 with a deliberately vague position on its relationship with PR 
China. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In addition to the many states in the world that appear to enjoy 
their statehood objectively, there are a widespread and diverse number 
of entities that are denied statehood, yet are treated as if they were 
states for certain issues. International law provides for statehood as a 
status available for territorial entities and none other. There is no 
formal quasi-statehood regime with its own understandings on rights, 
obligations and codes of participation. Thus, when an entity is 
proximate to statehood, but for some reason denied statehood, 
international law needs a solution. One option is to hold fast to the 
argument that it is not a state and thus refuse any participation on the 
international plane, potentially to the detriment of the inhabitants. 
Instead, international law tolerates piecemeal allocation of 
participatory rights as if the entity were a state for individual issues. 
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This paper has identified one basis for triggering this functional 
statehood regime: the status of the territorial entity. Other facts may 
also trigger the functional regime. For example, the particular question 
at issue. Not all international questions are amenable to functionality. 
What is emerging is that entities that exist in certain statuses—colonial 
entities, occupied or administered territories, transitional and seceding 
entities, and competing governments—are potentially able to 
participate in this functional way. Our next step will be to rationalize 
this approach and build a more predictable framework for determining 
when the functional approach is acceptable. For now, it is critical to 
recognize quasi-states as existing and potentially participating in a 
functional statehood, and describe them as such, to better adopt this 
phenomenon by international law. 
